Gender Diversity in Silicon Valley
A Comparison of Silicon Valley Public Companies and Large Public Companies
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Introduction

Since 2003, Fenwick & West has collected a unique body of information on the corporate governance practices of publicly traded companies that is useful for all Silicon Valley companies, publicly traded high technology and life science companies across the U.S. and public companies and their advisors generally. A large subset of that information is published in a Fenwick survey titled Corporate Governance Practices and Trends: A Comparison of Large Public Companies and Silicon Valley Companies.¹ This report on gender diversity is a companion supplement that expands on a subset of the data from which the broader corporate governance survey was drawn.² This report expands on the board diversity topic covered in the corporate governance report and focuses on women in leadership positions on the boards and executive management teams of the companies surveyed beginning with the 1996 proxy season through the 2013 proxy season (across 18 proxy seasons).

We recognize that leadership diversity can be measured using a wide range of factors and that the traditional factors of gender, race and ethnicity are not the only measures of a truly diverse population. We have elected to track the number of women on the boards and executive management teams of the high technology and life science companies included in the Silicon Valley 150 Index (SV 150) and the large public companies included in the Standard & Poor's 100 Index (S&P 100) as a measure of leadership diversity because gender can be more readily and accurately measured in public filings than other traditional diversity factors. Moreover, women are almost half of the workforce and hold slightly more than half of the management,

¹ A copy of the most recent edition of Corporate Governance Practices and Trends: A Comparison of Large Public Companies and Silicon Valley Companies, covering the data through the 2013 proxy season, is available at http://fenwick.com/CorporateGovernanceSurvey. This edition of Gender Diversity in Silicon Valley: A Comparison of Silicon Valley Public Companies and Large Public Companies similarly covers data through the 2013 proxy season.

² The prior survey is primarily focused on governance at the board level and included a section on board diversity. A small portion of the data in this report was previously published in the prior survey.
Introduction (continued)

For a number of years, there has been media coverage and commentary, as well as much discussion among participants in the Silicon Valley ecosystem, about the lack of gender diversity in Silicon Valley. Unfortunately, due to a lack of detailed research in the area, much of the discussion has been based on personal observation of a small number of situations or relatively limited statistical information, often measured at a relatively narrow point in time. This survey is intended as a contribution to that conversation, in the form of a broader set of statistics regarding the roles of women in senior leadership positions at public companies in Silicon Valley measured annually over almost two decades, along with a comparison set of similar statistics for large public companies nationally.

We hope this survey of gender diversity practices in Silicon Valley will further stimulate discussion and serve as a resource for measuring how well women are faring at the senior levels of leadership in the Silicon Valley workplace. We appreciate the efforts and good intentions of many companies in Silicon Valley as they strive to attract the very best, most talented employees and leadership teams while they seek to transform the world, as well as organizations that promote the development and advancement of women in entrepreneurship and as executives in the high technology and life science industries to further those goals.

3 See Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population Survey Household Data Annual Averages, Table 3 “Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional population by age, sex, and race”, which counts women as 46.9% of the average workforce in 2012, and Catalyst Quick Take: Women in Management in the United States, 1960–Present (2013), which shows that women held 51.5% of management (considering all levels), professional and related positions in 2012 based on a review of statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. While other aspects of traditional diversity are not as readily measured by review of SEC filings, other research shows that ethnic diversity is very high in Silicon Valley by some measures. See, e.g., “Asian workers now dominate Silicon Valley tech jobs” (San Jose Mercury News, November 30, 2012), reporting an increase in the Asian portion of the technology workforce from 39% in 2000 to 50% in 2010, based on U.S. Census data for software developers, computer programmers, systems analysts and support specialists in Santa Clara, San Mateo, Alameda, Contra Costa and San Francisco counties combined. But, see also the discussion of black and Latino participation in the tech workforce in those articles, as well as “Blacks, Latinos and women lose ground at Silicon Valley tech companies” (San Jose Mercury News, November 8, 2011).

4 See, e.g., “A Gold Ceiling: Why Can’t Females Strike It High-Tech Rich?” by Janelle Brown in Salon Magazine (September 11, 1999), “Female Execs Progress, with Room for More” by Mark Schwanhausser in the San Jose Mercury News (June 18, 2000), and “A woman’s work is rarely funded” by Jim Hopkins in USA Today (August 14, 2001), or much more recently “Tech Women Rock Joint Venture Silicon Valley Conference” by Mike Cassidy in the San Jose Mercury News’ SiliconBeat blog (February 14, 2013), “Commentary: Silicon Valley Discriminates Against Women, Even If They’re Better” by Paul Solman of the PBS NewsHour in its The Rundown blog (presenting an interview with Vivek Wadhwa, who also wrote “The Face of Success” series of articles in Inc., as well as substantially similar articles in Forbes and elsewhere), the San Francisco Chronicle Op-Ed piece (July 20, 2012) titled “Tech sector’s glass ceiling” by Steven Currill, Dean of the UC Davis Graduate School of Management (who also contributed to the study discussed in footnote 27) and “Silicon Valley still a boys-only club, according to the data” by Troy Wolverton in the San Jose Mercury News’ SiliconBeat blog (June 25, 2013). But see “Women Say It’s Easier To Succeed In The Valley” by Margaret Steen in the San Jose Mercury News (April 23, 2001) or “Too-bright spotlight burns female CEOs” by Gary Strauss and Del Jones in USA Today (December 18, 2000), noting that “while gender bias is less pervasive at Silicon Valley firms — which tend to be more receptive to women both when it comes to management positions and providing venture capital — it still lingers.”

5 Such as the number of women VCs at the most active VC firms in 2011 referenced in footnote 33, or the percentage of Internet company founders that were women in the first half of 2010 referenced in footnote 31. But, see also the Dow Jones VentureSource study of women executives at private, venture-backed companies from 1997–2011 referenced in footnote 36.
About the Data — Group Makeup

When reviewing this report, it is important to understand the makeup of the data set from which it is drawn. There are approximately 230 public companies in “Silicon Valley,” of which the SV 150 captures those that are the largest by one measure — revenue. However, there are thousands of high technology and life science companies based in Silicon Valley (as geographically defined for purposes of the SV 150) that are not public. They range from the proverbial founder/entrepreneur working alone in his or her garage and many tiny companies beginning to develop in a range of incubators, to seed-stage companies and various levels of venture capital–backed companies all the way up to fairly large companies such as Chegg, Corsair Components, GoPro or Silver Spring Networks. The public companies in the SV 150 are in some sense the cream of high technology and life science companies in Silicon Valley. They are companies that have reached a scale and level of success such that investment banks were willing to underwrite their IPOs and public investors were willing to buy their stock. Consequently, the data presented in this report should not be understood to be fully representative of “Silicon Valley” as a whole.

Similarly, it is important to understand the differences between the high technology and life science companies included in the SV 150 and the large public companies included in the S&P 100. The 2013 constituent companies of the SV 150 range from Apple and Hewlett-Packard (HP) with revenue of approximately $165B and $119B, respectively, to Zhone Technologies (Zhone) and Jive Software (Jive) with revenue of approximately $115M and $114M, respectively, in each case for the four quarters ended on or about December 31, 2012. HP went public in 1957, Apple in 1980, Zhone in 2001 and Jive in 2011. Apple and HP’s peers clearly include companies in the S&P 100, of which they are also constituent members.

6 The number fluctuates constantly as some companies complete initial public offerings and others are acquired. The number of Silicon Valley public companies is down from a high of 417 reached in 2000 during the dot-com era. See “Vanishing Public Companies Lead To The Incredible Shrinking Silicon Valley” (SiliconBeat, February 17, 2010) and “Outside Silicon Valley, IPO Market Still in Drought” (Seeking Alpha May 14, 2011).
7 See the “Methodology—Group Makeup” section beginning on p. 57 for a more detailed discussion of the makeup of the SV 150 and the geography of Silicon Valley for its purposes, including footnote 103.
8 There are also many more in the San Francisco Bay Area and elsewhere that are sometimes generically referred to collectively as “Silicon Valley” (meaning the industry).
9 Chegg completed its initial public offering on November 18, 2013. If Chegg had been public in 2012, it would have ranked 116 on the SV 150 list, which is ordered based on revenue, for the 2013 proxy season; and Silver Spring Networks (SSN), which went public in March 2013, would have ranked 119 had it been public in 2012. Similarly, Facebook went public in May 2012 (with more than 3,000 employees) and would have ranked 25th on the SV 150 list for the 2012 proxy season had it been public in 2011 (it ranked 16th for the 2013 proxy season). Corsair Components, which has been estimated to have 2012 revenue in excess of $500M and to have more than 800 employees, and GoPro (formally Woodman Labs Inc.), which has also been estimated to have revenues in excess of $500M and to have 400 or more employees, are still private and likely would have ranked in the top half of the SV 150 had they been public by the end of 2012.
10 Obviously, as the examples in the prior footnote illustrate, this is not a perfect metaphor.
11 The standards for a successful IPO evolve constantly depending on a variety of factors related to, among other things, investor risk appetite, economic conditions and recent IPO trends, and are beyond the scope of this report. They are considerably different today compared with standards effectively in place at the beginning of the survey period (or in place when those companies went public). Consequently, there are certainly a number of public companies represented in the survey (in prior years and in the most recent proxy season) that would not necessarily meet current IPO standards. Conversely, there are a number of companies that could conduct a successful IPO, but for a variety of reasons (that are also beyond the scope of this report), they have not yet decided to do so.
(eight companies were constituents of both indices for the survey in the 2013 proxy season), where market capitalization averages approximately $98B. Zhone and Jive’s peers are smaller technology companies that went public over the last half decade or so and have market capitalizations well under $1B. In terms of number of employees, the SV 150 averages 8,500 employees, ranging from HP with 331,800 employees spread around the world in dozens of countries to companies such as Ubiquiti Networks with 150 employees in four countries, as of the end of their respective fiscal years 2012. The S&P 100 averages 170,000 employees, including Wal-Mart with 2.2 million employees in more than two dozen countries at its most recent fiscal year-end. Compared with the S&P 100, SV 150 companies are on average much smaller and younger, have lower revenue and are concentrated in the high technology and life science industries. Just as the S&P 100 companies are not necessarily representative of companies in the United States generally, the SV 150 companies are not necessarily representative of Silicon Valley generally.

It is worth noting that the broad range of companies in the SV 150 (whether measured in terms of size, age or revenue) is associated with a similarly broad range of gender diversity. Comparison of gender diversity statistics and trends for the top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies of the SV 150 (in terms of revenue) bears this out, and some examples of such comparisons are included in this report.
Gender Diversity on the Board of Directors

Under applicable SEC disclosure rules, companies are required to disclose whether they consider diversity in identifying nominees to the board of directors. However, companies have the flexibility to define diversity for themselves, and such definitions typically include a wide range of factors, not simply traditional diversity factors such as gender, race and ethnicity. Consequently, it is fairly difficult to measure board diversity in a systematic way when relying primarily on the information in public filings.

As noted in the “Introduction”, we elected to track gender as a measure of board diversity for the high technology and life science companies in the SV 150 and S&P 100 companies because gender can be more readily measured in public filings than other traditional diversity factors. While a wealth of long-term, large-scale research on the effect of women serving on boards is not yet available, recent studies have suggested that having women directors may improve the performance of a company and its board, particularly in adverse macroeconomic or industry environments with increased volatility.

19 See current Item 407(c)(2)(vi) of Regulation S-K (“Describe... whether, and if so how, the nominating committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying nominees for director. If the nominating committee (or the board) has a policy with regard to the consideration of diversity in identifying director nominees, describe how this policy is implemented, as well as how the nominating committee (or the board) assesses the effectiveness of its policy.”) and SEC Release No. 33-9089 (“We recognize that companies may define diversity in various ways, reflecting different perspectives. For instance, some companies may conceptualize diversity expansively to include differences of viewpoint, professional experience, education, skill and other individual qualities and attributes that contribute to board heterogeneity, while others may focus on diversity concepts such as race, gender and national origin. We believe that for purposes of this disclosure requirement, companies should be allowed to define diversity in ways that they consider appropriate. As a result we have not defined diversity in the amendments.”). Companies typically include factors such as diversity of business experience, viewpoints, personal background (sometimes specifying race and gender) and skills in technology, finance, marketing, international business, financial reporting and other areas (if they provide even this level of definition in their disclosures) when describing how their boards consider diversity when making nomination decisions. They do not typically describe how each sitting director or nominee measures against each of those factors (to the extent they enumerate them at all as part of the definition).

20 However, for a report on traditional diversity factors, see “Missing Pieces: Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards — 2010 Alliance for Board Diversity Census” (July 21, 2011), which “conducted extensive research to confirm the gender, race and ethnicity of directors” and found that white men make up 74.5% of the Fortune 500 board seats in 2010, with white women, minority men and minority women making up 12.7%, 9.9% and 3.0%, respectively.

21 See also “Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make?” by Deborah Rhode and Amanda Packel of Stanford Law School (September 2010) and “Is There a 'Business Case' for Board Diversity?” by Yi Wang and Bob Cliff, 21 Pacific Accounting Rev. 88 (2009), which review recent studies on the subject, discussing their inconclusive results and methodological shortcomings.

22 See, e.g., the Catalyst reports “The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards (2004–2008)” and “The Bottom Line: Connecting Corporate Performance and Gender Diversity,” and “Gender diversity and corporate performance” (August 2012) by the Credit Suisse Research Institute, which found in a review of the 2,360 constituent companies in the Morgan Stanley Capital International All Country World Index (MSCI ACWI) each year since 2005 “that, in a like-for-like comparison, companies with at least one woman on the board would have outperformed in terms of share price performance, those with no women on the board over the course of the past six years... [with] almost all of the outperformance... delivered post-2008, since the macro environment deteriorated and volatility increased” and “Does the Gender of Directors Matter?” by Miriam Schwartz-Ziv (May 7, 2013), which found in a review of detailed board minutes for eleven for-profit companies in which the Israeli government holds a substantial equity interest “that boards that included critical masses of at least three directors of each gender, and particularly of three women, were approximately twice as likely to request further information and to take an initiative, compared to boards without such critical masses.” The Credit Suisse Research Institute observed that “stocks with greater gender diversity on their boards generally look defensive: they tend to perform best when markets are falling, deliver higher average ROEs through the cycle, exhibit less volatility in earnings and typically have lower gearing ratios.” That report also offers “seven key reasons why greater gender diversity could be correlated with stronger corporate performance” (discussing the existing research related to each): a signal of a better company; greater effort across the board; a better mix of leadership skills; access to a wider pool of talent; a better reflection of the consumer decision-maker; improved corporate governance; [and] risk aversion.” But, see also the Rhode and Packel paper cited in footnote 21, which found in a review of dozens of recent studies on board diversity “that the relationship between diversity and financial performance has not been convincingly established” (but also finding that “when diversity is well managed, it can improve decision making and can enhance a corporation’s public image by conveying commitments to equal opportunity and inclusion”), and the Wang and Cliff article also cited in footnote 21, which found no statistically significant relationship between the percentage of female directors, the percentage of minority directors or the percentage of female and minority directors and subsequent ROA, ROE or shareholder return.
However, while voluntary inclusion of women directors may provide positive benefits for companies, other studies suggest a potential negative impact where there is a legally mandated substantial minimum quota for women directors. Recent research has suggested that, while board members believe that board diversity (defined in traditional terms of gender, race and ethnicity) is a valuable outcome that boards should pursue, it is very difficult for them to provide concrete examples from their experience of when gender, race and ethnic diversity has made a tangible difference in board performance.

U.S. companies are reported to have the fifth highest number of women on boards as a percentage of board seats among 45 economically advanced countries. While there has been recurring discussion regarding the relatively low number of women directors among public company boards in Silicon Valley relative to public companies generally in the United States, our review of the data suggests that board size may be a significant factor affecting the number of women directors, and to some degree that is a function of the

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23 See, e.g., two studies, each of which reviewed company performance in Norway, which has had a law requiring that 40% of directors for all public companies be women since 2003 (with phase-in through 2008) and is the only country with such a substantial quota in effect for a meaningful duration: “The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation” by Kenneth Ahern and Amy Dittmar (May 20, 2011), finding an associated decrease in stock price (as well as finding that “[t]he quota led to younger and less experienced boards, increases in leverage and acquisitions, and deterioration in operating performance, consistent with less capable boards”), and “A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas” by David Matsa and Amalia Miller (December 2, 2011), finding a decrease in short term profitability (as well as finding “that firms affected by the quota undertook fewer workforce reductions than comparison firms, increasing relative labor costs and employment levels... [with the] effects strongest among firms that had no female board members before the quota was introduced and present even for boards with older and more experienced members”). These effects may be the result of the relatively short implementation period of the Norwegian law (particularly if the candidate pool contained relatively fewer women — or women with relatively less experience — compared with the required quota) combined with idiosyncratic differences in economic conditions in the periods studied that may not have been fully taken into account in the studies.

24 See “The Danger of Difference — Tensions in Directors’ Views of Corporate Board Diversity” by Kimberly Krawiec, John Conley and Lissa Broome, published in the University of Illinois Law Review (Vol. 2013), also available on SSRN, which reported on interviews of 50 current and former public board members, as well as seven others who serve as consultants or proxy advisors to public boards.

25 See the Catalyst report “Women on Boards” (August 16, 2012).

26 Gender balance on listed company boards has also been the subject of much discussion in the European Union (EU), where women made up 13.7% of listed company boards and the EU Justice Commissioner recently introduced proposed legislation that would require listed companies to reserve at least 40% of their non-executive director board seats for women by 2020 (see, e.g., the “Working Document on the proposal on a Directive of the EP and of the Council on improving gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures” by the European Parliament Committees on Legal Affairs and on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (March 6, 2013), which would require listed companies below the 40% threshold to establish clear, unambiguous selection criteria and give females preference in situations of equally qualified candidates). A number of countries have already introduced such quotas, including Belgium, France, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Spain, among others. The Credit Suisse Research Institute report cited in footnote 22 above notes that “only 41% of MSCI ACWI stocks had any women on their boards at the end of 2005, but this had increased to 59% by the end of 2011.” EU data shows that, in January 2012, women represented only 13.7% of board members in large listed companies (see “Women in economic decision-making in the EU: Progress report (A Europe 2020 initiative)” (2012)). While occasionally suggested as something to be considered in the United States, there is meaningful doubt as to the constitutionality of such a quota were it to be adopted (see, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). In August 2013, the California Senate passed a non-binding resolution urging that by the end of 2016 every public company in California with at least 9 director seats have a minimum of 3 women directors, those with 5 to 8 directors have at least 2 women directors and those with fewer seats have at least 1 woman director (see California Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 62). For a recent review of gender diversity practices at S&P 100 companies (evaluating equal employment opportunity policies, internal and external diversity initiatives, family-friendly benefits, director selection criteria and representation on the board of directors and among highest-paid executives), see “Examining the Cracks in the Ceiling: A Survey of Corporate Diversity Practices of the S&P 100” by Calvert Investments (March 2013).

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Gender Diversity on the Board of Directors (continued)

relatively small size of many SV 150 companies. For example, while S&P 100 companies tend to have more women directors than SV 150 companies when measured in absolute numbers (S&P 100 average = 2.4 and SV 150 average = 0.8 women in the 2013 proxy season), the difference (while significant) is less pronounced when measured as a percentage of the total number of directors (S&P 100 average = 19.9% of directors and SV 150 average = 9.1% of directors in the 2013 proxy season). In addition, the data for the top 15 of the SV 150 is closer to that of the S&P 100 than to the SV 150 generally (top 15 average = 1.5 in the 2013 proxy season, down from average = 1.9 in the 2011 proxy season), despite having smaller average board size (top 15 of SV 150 average = 10.4; S&P 100 average = 12.0). Further, significantly affecting the average in the SV 150 are the 65 companies without any women directors, of which 39 are companies with 7 or fewer total board members (and only 1 of which has more than 9 directors).

While our data focuses on a limited number of public companies in Silicon Valley and large public companies nationally, this observation appears to be true among the largest companies as well. Compare the data showing that white men make up 69.9% of the Fortune 100 board seats in 2010, with white women, minority men and minority women making up 14.6%, 12.1% and 3.4% with the Fortune 500 data shown in footnote 20. That report shows that the Fortune 100 companies had a mean board size of 12.1 compared with a mean of 11.1 for Fortune 500 companies. A similar conclusion was reached by the 2012–2013 UC Davis Study of California Women Business Leaders — A Census of Women Directors and Highest-Paid Executives, a review of the 400 largest public companies in California (stating that “[o]verall, the largest companies have larger boards and three times as many women directors as the smallest companies (1.8 women, on average, versus 0.65); [c]ompanies with the largest market capitalization [top decile] ($53 billion on average) have the highest average share of women directors, with 17.7%; [w]ith the next highest percentage being only 12.2% at the second highest decile ($6.6 billion average market capitalization); [a]nd [c]ompanies in the third smallest market capitalization category [third lowest decile] ($392 million on average) have the smallest average percentage of women board members (5.5%).”)

and by The Boston Club’s “2012 Census of Women Directors and Executive Officers of Massachusetts Public Companies — Unfinished Business,” a review of the 100 largest public companies in Massachusetts (stating that “when measured by net revenue, company size is directly related to the percentage of women on Census company boards. The percentage of women on the boards of the largest companies is nearly twice that of the smallest companies” and showing that women make up 18.9% of directors at companies with revenue of $5B or more, but only 9.7% of directors at companies with less than $500M of revenue). See also “Uneven Progress: Female Directors in the Russell 3000” by Annalisa Barrett of The Corporate Library (2010), which reached a similar conclusion (“gender diversity is much less prevalent in the universe beyond the largest and highest-profile companies” and while the “vast majority (89 percent) of the companies in the S&P 500 have at least one female director,” “only 60 percent of companies comprising the Russell 3000 as a whole, and only half of Russell 2000 companies [all smaller companies], have at least one female director.”). See also the Equilar 2013 Compensation and Governance Report (“[i]n 2011, 76 percent of companies in the S&P 1500 had one or more female board members”). Compare GMI Ratings’ 2013 Women on Boards Survey (April 2013) by Kimberly Gladman and Michelle Lamb (“In general, larger companies have more diverse boards: currently 16.9% of S&P 500 directors are women, compared to 13.5% of directors in the S&P Midcap Index and 11.3% in the S&P Smallcaps. The S&P 1500, which is made up of the preceding three indices combined, has 14.0% women on its boards; the Russell 1000 (comprised of the 1000 largest companies in the US) has 14.7%, and the small-cap Russell 2000 has only 10.0.”).

When measured as a percentage of the total number of directors, top 15 average = 14.4% in the 2013 proxy season; down from average = 16.7% in the 2011 proxy season. As many companies add board seats, their boards generally expand the mix of skills and experiences that they seek to have represented, often into areas where women are more represented than they are in the mix in effect for smaller boards or companies at earlier stages of development.

This is not simply a Silicon Valley phenomenon. See, e.g., the UC Davis Graduate School of Management study referenced in footnote 27, which found that “[n]early half (44.8%) of California’s 400 largest public companies have no women directors; 33.8% of the companies have one woman director; [o]nly 86 (21.5%) of the companies have two or more women directors; and 22 companies (5.5%) with three or more women directors”—bearing in mind that Silicon Valley companies (defined simply as being headquartered in Santa Clara County, irrespective of industry) made up slightly more than a quarter of the companies covered in that study (which also suggested that industry was a contributing factor). See also the GMI Ratings survey referenced in footnote 27, which noted that “[t]he S&P 500, more than 9 out of 10 companies have at least one female director, and over a quarter have at least three; in the Russell 2000, in contrast, fewer than 60% of companies have at least one woman director, and fewer than 6% have at least three.” In fact, there is data suggesting that Silicon Valley companies lead technology companies in this area (see the “U.S. Technology Board Index 2012” by Spencer Stuart, which surveys “200 top technology companies in the United States,” including 70 companies based in Silicon Valley, and found that “[t]he majority of technology boards, 60%, have at least one woman serving on the board, trailing both Silicon Valley boards (63%) and the S&P 500 (91%); [w]omen represent 11% of the total number of directors on technology boards”).
The following graphs show the percentage of companies with at least one woman director and the distributions by number of women directors among the boards of companies in each group during the 2013 proxy season.

WOMEN DIRECTORS — 2013 PROXY SEASON DISTRIBUTION

**SV 150**

- 2013
- % of companies with at least 1 woman director: 56.7%

**S&P 100**

- 2013
- % of companies with at least 1 woman director: 98.0%
The following graph shows the distribution of women directors by number of women directors at each board size among the boards of companies in each group during the 2013 proxy season.

DISTRIBUTIONS BY BOARD SIZE VS. NUMBER OF WOMEN DIRECTORS — 2013 PROXY SEASON

S&P 100 (100 COMPANIES) vs. SV 150 (150 COMPANIES)
Gender Diversity on the Board of Directors (continued)

Based on anecdotal experience and review of biographical information for executive officers, directors and nominees, other factors beyond board size that contribute to much, but perhaps not all, of the relative dearth of women on the boards of the high technology and life science companies in the SV 150\(^{30}\) appear to be that:

- CEOs generally serve on their own boards, and women are under represented among CEOs;\(^{31}\)
- venture capitalists, holding sizable shares of the companies’ stock and carrying over from the private company boards, tend to represent a sizable portion of the independent directors for companies conducting initial public offerings in Silicon Valley\(^{32}\) — and women make up a small percentage of such investment professionals;\(^{33}\)
- turnover on public company boards tends to be very low and has been declining\(^{34}\) — providing relatively few opportunities for women to be added to boards absent an increase in board size;

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\(^{30}\) The UC Davis Graduate School of Management study discussed in footnote 27 suggests a more nuanced view of the contribution of industry to the relative dearth of women board members, finding that “technology software” was among the highest (63%) and “semiconductors” was distinctly the lowest (28%), with “pharmaceuticals” and “technology hardware” in between (54% and 53%, respectively), in terms of percentage of companies in an industry with one or more women directors (also providing information for industries identified as “health care,” “financial services,” “consumer goods,” “utilities and telecommunications” and “energy, materials and industrials”).

\(^{31}\) See the discussion under “Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team” beginning on p. 30, including the discussion of executive positions beyond CEO that, in addition to founders, are the pipeline for CEO positions. See also Venture Capital Human Capital (Jan to June 2010 — Venture Capital Activity Report) by CB Insights, which found that only 8% of founders in California receiving Seed or Series A funding for Internet companies were female and 89% of founding teams in that category were all-male (only 3% all-female).

\(^{32}\) Historically, the typical board of a Silicon Valley IPO company has been approximately seven directors, one of which is typically the CEO, three or four of which are representatives of the investors that funded the company prior to the IPO (typically VCs) and the remainder of which typically consist of an audit committee financial expert/chair and one or two directors with experience as a CEO of a similar-growth company and/or executive experience in the relevant industry or market.

\(^{33}\) See, e.g., the Kauffman Foundation report “Gatekeepers of Venture Growth: The Role and Participation of Women in the Venture Capital Industry” or Leslie Bradshaw’s Forbes article “How Women Are Getting Left Out of the Venture Capital Game” (January 10, 2012) and accompanying statistics regarding women at top VC firms, which show that slightly less than 10% of VCs are women, and the National Venture Capital Association and Dow Jones VentureSource 2011 Venture Census, which shows that 11% of venture investors are women (compared with 14% in 2008, when measured slightly differently) and notes that “[t]he percentage of women in the industry was inversely proportional to the age ranges: [o]f respondents under 30 years old, 28% were women; [o]f those in their 30s, 27% were women; 40s and 50s, 22%; and over 60 years old, 13%.” See also The Brand Influence Guide for the Venture Capital Industry (BIG:VC) study published by DeSantis Breindel, which noted that when CEOs are considering VC firms, the gender mix of partners and other professionals in a VC firm matters more than VCs realize (with approximately 25% of CEOs saying it matters, but only 10% of VCs saying so), especially for female CEOs.

\(^{34}\) According to the Second Quarter 2013 issue of Directors & Boards, the number of new directors has declined in the last 5 and 10 years by 12% and 27%, respectively. To a degree, low turnover reflects the value of the historical knowledge of a company and its business held by board incumbents, as well as the value of maintaining a good board dynamic and collegiality among members, where turnover in a small group risks adversely impacting a previously effective dynamic. Further, it has been observed that, without term or age limits, it is often difficult for companies to suggest to board members that they retire or leave (according to the same issue of Directors & Boards, in the last 10 years, the average age of directors increased from 60.1 to 62.6, with the percentage of directors age 64+ increasing from 14% to 32%). While the National Association of Corporate Directors recommends adoption of a mandatory retirement age and term limits of 10 to 15 years to promote turnover and obtain fresh ideas, a number of institutional investors oppose such limits (see, e.g., the ISS 2012 U.S. Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines (p. 17) and the AFL-CIO Proxy Voting Guidelines (2012) — Guideline IV.A.11). Further, while larger public companies often have Corporate Governance Guidelines/Principles that include age limits ranging from 70 to 80 years old, many companies have no limit at all and, even with limits in place, exceptions are often made.
when looking for new board members, nominating committees are generally focused on finding candidates with CEO or other board or executive experience in industries, markets or technologies relevant to their company — and women make up a fairly small portion of the pool of potential candidates in the relevant industry (or sector of the industry); and

nominating committees and board members as a whole often start their search for board candidates by looking in their own networks of contacts (even if a professional search firm is also retained), and smaller companies often do not retain a professional search firm to find board candidates — reducing the chance that women will be represented in the candidate pool for some boards due to idiosyncratic network effects.

To some degree, the relatively small number of companies based in Silicon Valley (the SV 150 captures most of those that are public) and the relatively small size of Silicon Valley boards means that women in Silicon Valley have relatively fewer opportunities to become public company board members and thereby come to be seen as a peer and enter the networks of board members and consultants seeking board candidates. This is further exacerbated by the fact that high technology and life science companies encompass a vast array of businesses and technologies, and board candidates are often sought with experience in a particular niche within that array (e.g., enterprise software or security technologies or Internet retail or social media, etc.).

35 See the discussion of factors boards consider when making nomination decisions in footnote 19. This is an area of increased focus among institutional investors. See also “Do Independent Expert Directors Matter?” by Ronald Masulis, Christian Ruzzier, Sheng Xiao and Shan Zhao (June 1, 2012), which found that the proportion of independent directors with prior industry experience correlates to positive firm performance (i.e., firms with a higher percentage of independent expert directors have higher book-value multiples, fewer earnings restatements, better CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and, of particular importance to the innovation-focused high technology and life science companies of Silicon Valley, more patents and citations of those patents), with positive stock market reaction to the appointment of independent directors with prior industry experience (where, by contrast, the appointment of independent directors without prior industry work experience has no such positive correlations to firm performance).

36 See, e.g., the UC Davis Graduate School of Management study discussed in footnote 27 (“Women account for 8.9% of the 2,005 highest-paid executives in the 400 largest public companies in California”) and the Dow Jones VentureSource report “Women at the Wheel: Do Female Executives Drive Start-Up Success?” (“1.3% of privately held companies have a female founder, 6.5% have a female CEO, and 20% have one or more female C-level executives”). See also the GMI Ratings survey referenced in footnote 27, which noted that “[n]ominating committees seeking to increase board diversity, however, sometimes struggle to find an adequate pool of candidates through traditional sources.”

37 Particularly at smaller public companies, fees for a retained search firm can represent a substantial expense, while they often have directors who consider themselves to be well connected to a collective pool that includes many qualified candidates. See The Conference Board’s “Director Compensation and Board Practices: 2013 Edition,” which found that most smaller companies avoid incurring search-firm fees and instead use personal connections to recruit new director nominees. See also the discussion of women in leadership in the “US Board Index 2012” report by Spencer Stuart, a leading executive search consulting firm.

38 While there are a large number of private companies in Silicon Valley, many of those have not received venture capital funding and, even those that have may not have reached a stage such that their executives or board members might be considered peers for public board candidate searches; and private companies in Silicon Valley, including late-stage startups, generally have smaller boards than those represented in the SV 150. Consequently, even factoring in participation in private companies in Silicon Valley, there are still relatively few opportunities for an individual to come to be seen as a peer and enter the networks of board members and consultants seeking board candidates.

39 To a degree, this is offset by the desire of technology companies in some sectors to recruit board candidates in particular customer verticals or with relevant non-technology experience (e.g., consumer/retail), sometimes opening up the candidate pool to industries with many more women who are potential candidates (and these searches are also often more likely to involve a professional search firm).
A recent study explored the lack of significant diversity on corporate boards by pursuing a “qualitative interview strategy,” in which the authors interviewed fifty-seven people with direct experience with corporate boards, as directors, executives, consultants, regulators or proxy advisors, of which fifty had served as directors of publicly traded corporations. The authors noted that during the course of their interviews, they had heard from participants “many concrete ideas for improving [diversity] numbers, including:

- [defining] qualifications more broadly; include other C-suite executives besides the CEO as well as division presidents and leaders from government service, accounting, retired military, and academia;
- [not requiring] prior public company board experience;
- [identifying] the skill sets needed for new board members and then look specifically for women or minorities who have that skill set, rather using diversity as a “plus” factor;
- [limiting] some searches to women or minority candidates;
- [valuing] different perspectives that could be provided by someone with different industry experience (e.g., technology or mining firms going outside of these industries), or from a younger person with experience with social media or other emerging technologies that older directors may not be familiar with; and
- [working] on structural issues that may impede the advancement of women and minorities in corporations.”

A 2011 article in *NACD Directorship* reached similar conclusions and suggested that rigorous board evaluations in the interest of increasing board effectiveness will have the salutary result of more diverse boards.

During the period covered by the survey, there has been a general upward trend in both groups of companies in the average percentage of board members that are women (SV 150 average = 2.1% in 1996 and 9.1% in the 2013 proxy season; S&P 100 average = 10.9% in 1996 and 19.9% in the 2013 proxy season), though there was a period of relative stagnation from the 2008 through 2011 proxy seasons. While at all times the S&P 100 has significantly exceeded the SV 150 in terms of average number and average percentage of women directors, the growth rate of women directors, in terms of either the average number of women per board or the average percentage of boards that are women, has been much faster in the SV 150 (approximately 320% growth) than in the S&P 100 (approximately 80% growth) over the survey period.

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40 See the study referenced in footnote 24.
41 See “Diversity: Acting on What We Know” by Judy Warner (September 9, 2011), discussing a roundtable of prominent public company directors (also noting that age and term limits, while used by many boards, have become, in some directors’ views, a cop-out for full-board evaluation).
However, while there has been a distinct downward trend in the percentage of SV 150 companies with no women directors (82.3% in 1996; 43.3% in the 2013 proxy season), there are still dramatically fewer such companies in the S&P 100 (10.6% in 1996; 2.0% in the 2013 proxy season). Our data shows that within the SV 150, this fairly closely tracks with the size of company (measured by revenue), which also correlates with board size, with 62.0% of the bottom 50 companies having no women directors in the 2012 proxy season but that being true for only one of the top 15 SV 150 companies (similar to the S&P 100). In addition, both groups have seen marked increases in the percentage of companies with two or more women directors (SV 150 from 2.5% in 1996 to 16.0% in 2013; S&P 100 from 43.6% in 1996 to 85.0% in the 2013 proxy season).
The following graphs show the average number and the average percentage of women directors for each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the SV 150 broken down by the top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies) over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

**AVERAGE NUMBER OF WOMEN DIRECTORS — 1996–2013**

**S&P 100 vs. SV 150**

**SV 150 Breakdown**

**AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN DIRECTORS — 1996–2013**

**S&P 100 vs. SV 150**

**SV 150 Breakdown**
The following graphs show the percentage of companies with at least one woman director in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the SV 150 broken down by the top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies) over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES WITH AT LEAST ONE WOMAN DIRECTOR — 1996–2013

**S&P 100 vs. SV 150**

**SV 150 Breakdown**
The following graphs show the trend in the distribution by number and percentage of women directors in each group (showing both the median number or percentage and the cutoffs for the deciles with the most women directors) over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.
Gender Diversity on the Board of Directors (continued)

The following graphs show the respective imbalances in the percentage of executive officers, named executive officers, board members, committee members and committee chairs that are women among all companies and among companies with at least one woman serving on the board of directors in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 during the 2013 proxy season.

**GENDER IMBALANCES: SV 150 vs. S&P 100 — 2013 PROXY SEASON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Companies</th>
<th>At least one woman director</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executives</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEOs</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Members</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Chairs</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These graphs show the percentage of companies during the 2013 proxy season with and without at least one woman serving on the board, then of those companies, the percentage with at least one woman executive officer, then of those companies, the percentage with at least one woman named executive officer, and then of those companies, the percentage with a woman CEO.

GENDER DIVERSITY — BRANCHING PERCENTAGES

Gender Diversity on the Board of Directors (continued)
Gender Diversity on Board Committees

Historically, there has been a view that women were selected for committee assignments less frequently or were selected for different committees than men.44 The participation of women in the major functions of a board is an important indicator of whether they are being viewed as equal partners with their male peers. One measurable indicator of that participation is membership on board committees. Our data shows that, in a shift away from the historical perception, the participation of women on board committees generally increased over the period of the survey at a pace faster than the increase in women as a percentage of board memberships in each of the groups surveyed. However, as discussed below, the slope of the trend varies by type of committee (though with a reasonably similar difference between the SV 150 and the S&P 100 companies across the primary audit, compensation and nominating committees).

The following graph shows the ratio of the average representation of women on the primary board committees (audit, compensation and nominating) to the average representation of women on boards of directors overall in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

**RATIO OF WOMEN PRIMARY COMMITTEE REPRESENTATION TO WOMEN DIRECTOR REPRESENTATION — 1996–2013**
(Average Percentage of Women on Primary Committees divided by Average Percentage of Women on Board)

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See, e.g., Diana Bilimoria and Sandy Kristin Piderit, Board Committee Membership: Effects of Sex-Based Bias, 37 Acad. of Mgmt. J. 1453, 1469 (1994), which looked at the audit, compensation, nominating, executive, finance and public affairs committees of the Fortune 300 firms for 1984 and found that men, after controlling for experience-based characteristics, were preferred for the compensation, executive and finance committees, while women were preferred for public affairs committees — though “[f]or the audit and nominating committees, no significant main effect of sex was detected.”
Gender Diversity on Board Committees (continued)

Audit Committee

S&P 100 companies tended to have more women as a percentage of the total number of audit committee members over the survey period (S&P 100 moving from 14.9% in 1996 to 21.5% in 2013; SV 150 moving from 1.3% in 1996 to 11.4% in the 2013 proxy season). In addition, the data for the top 15 of the SV 150 was closer to that of S&P 100 than to the SV 150 generally (top 15 moving from 4.4% in 1996 up to 20.4% in 2008, before declining to 11.5% in the 2013 proxy season). Further, significantly affecting the average in the SV 150 were the 65 companies in 2013 without at least one woman director (larger numbers in prior years). Excluding companies in both groups with no women directors, the percentage of the total number of audit committee members for SV 150 companies was similar to S&P 100 companies, particularly since the 2003 proxy season.

The following graphs show the percentage of audit committee members that are women for all companies in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the top 15 of the SV 150 broken out separately), as well as for only those companies in each group that have at least one woman director, over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

PERCENTAGE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS THAT ARE WOMEN — 1996–2013

For a discussion of gender diversity among audit committee chairs, see the applicable discussion and graphics under “Gender Diversity in Board Leadership—Committee Chairs” on pages 28–29.
Compensation Committee

S&P 100 companies tended to have more women as a percentage of the total number of compensation committee members over the survey period (S&P 100 moving from 9.2% in 1996 to 18.8% in 2013; SV 150 moving from 2.2% in 1996 to 9.3% in the 2013 proxy season). However, the data for the top 15 of the SV 150 was generally closer to that of the SV 150 as a whole, with occasional peaks similar to the S&P 100 (top 15 moving from 9.5% in 1996 up to 13.5% in 2013, but with drops to approximately 5% and spikes to above 15% in between). Further, significantly affecting the average in the SV 150 were the 65 companies in 2013 without at least one woman director (larger numbers in prior years). Excluding companies in both groups with no women directors, the percentage of the total number of compensation committee members for SV 150 companies was similar to S&P 100 companies, although slightly lower since the 2009 proxy season.

The following graphs show the percentage of compensation committee members that are women for all companies in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the top 15 of the SV 150 broken out separately), as well as for only those companies in each group that have at least one woman director, over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

PERCENTAGE OF COMPENSATION COMMITTEE MEMBERS THAT ARE WOMEN — 1996–2013

For a discussion of gender diversity among compensation committee chairs, see the applicable discussion and graphics under “Gender Diversity in Board Leadership—Committee Chairs” on pages 28–29.
Nominating Committee

S&P 100 companies tended to have more women as a percentage of the total number of nominating committee members over the survey period (S&P 100 moving from 11.1% in 1996 to 21.8% in 2013; SV 150 moving from 1.6% in 1996 to 7.9% in the 2013 proxy season). However, the data for the top 15 of the SV 150 started generally closer to that of the SV 150 as a whole, but moved to be more similar to the S&P 100 over the period of the survey (top 15 moving from 3.2% in 1996 up to 20.4% in 2011, before declining to 15.0% in 2013). Further, significantly affecting the average in the SV 150 were the 65 companies in 2013 without at least one woman director (larger numbers in prior years). However, excluding companies in both groups with no women directors eliminated only about half of the gap between SV 150 companies and S&P 100 companies in the percentage of the total number of nominating committee members that are women.

The following graphs show the percentage of nominating committee members that are women for all companies in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the top 15 of the SV 150 broken out separately), as well as for only those companies in each group that have at least one woman director, over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

PERCENTAGE OF NOMINATING COMMITTEE MEMBERS THAT ARE WOMEN — 1996–2013

For a discussion of gender diversity among nominating committee chairs, see the applicable discussion and graphics under “Gender Diversity in Board Leadership—Committee Chairs” on pages 28–29.
Gender Diversity on Board Committees (continued)

Other Standing Committees

Over the survey period, S&P 100 companies tended more frequently to have at least one woman serving as a member of an additional committee when they had one or more additional committees (S&P 100 moving from 57.9% in 1996 to 73.5% in 2013; SV 150 moving from 8.3% in 1996 to 26.7% in the 2013 proxy season). However, the data for the top 15 of the SV 150 started generally closer to that of SV 150, but moved to be more similar to the S&P 100 over the period of the survey (top 15 moving from 0.0% in 1996 up to 62.5% in 2008 and 2010, before declining to 44.4% in the 2013 proxy season). Further, significantly affecting the percentage in the SV 150 were the 65 companies in 2013 without at least one woman director (larger numbers in prior years). Limiting the data to only those companies with at least one woman on the board eliminated less than half of the gap between SV 150 companies and S&P 100 companies in the percentage of companies that had at least one woman serving as a member of an additional committee when they had one or more additional committees.

The following graphs show the percentage of companies in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the top 15 of the SV 150 broken out separately) with standing committees other than one of the primary committees that have at least one woman serving as a member of a standing committee, as well as for only those companies in each group that have at least one woman director, over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.45

PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES WITH AT LEAST ONE WOMAN MEMBER OF AN OTHER COMMITTEE — 1996–2013
(Among those that have Other Standing Committees)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Companies</th>
<th>Companies with at least 1 Woman Director</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S&amp;P 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SV Top 15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SV 150</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SV Top 15</td>
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<td>SV 150</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>S&amp;P 100</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73.5%</td>
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<td>44.4%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a discussion of gender diversity among chairs of other standing committees, see the applicable discussion and graphics under “Gender Diversity in Board Leadership—Committee Chairs” on pages 28–29.

45 Standing committees beyond the primary committees (audit, compensation and nominating) are relatively uncommon in the SV 150 (primarily existing among the largest companies), leading to the significant volatility in the SV 150 data reflected in the graphs.
Gender Diversity in Board Leadership

Historically, there has been a view that women serve in board leadership positions very infrequently. Research has suggested that underrepresentation in board leadership positions has continued into recent years.\(^4\) In addition to understanding trends in the rate of inclusion of women in board membership, an understanding of trends in the rate of inclusion of women in leadership positions on the board is useful to understanding their opportunities to influence actions at a company (some of which may also influence gender diversity at public companies). Similarly once women are included in board membership, or are included in increasing numbers, the frequency with which women are included in leadership positions on the board (and how that participation rate compares with the percentage of boards that are women) is useful as an important indicator of whether they are being viewed as equal partners with their male peers.

The following graphs show the percentage of all board leadership positions (chair, lead director or committee chair) that are held by women in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the top 15 of the SV 150 broken out separately), as well as for only those companies in each group that have at least one woman director, over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN ALL BOARD LEADERSHIP POSITIONS — 1996–2013
(Board Chair, Lead Director, All Committee Chairs)

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See, e.g., the “2012 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Board Directors.”
The following graph shows the ratio of the average representation of women in board leadership positions to the average representation of women on boards of directors overall in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

**RATIO OF WOMEN IN BOARD LEADERSHIP POSITIONS TO WOMEN DIRECTOR REPRESENTATION — 1996–2013**

(Average Percentage of Women in All Board Leadership divided by Average Percentage of Women on Board)
Gender Diversity in Board Leadership (continued)

Board Chair

The most significant board leadership role is often the board chair, who typically has the ability to call board meetings and set agendas, coordinates among directors, serves as the board’s primary liaison with the CEO and executive team and often has significant influence on strategy or operations. Research has shown that women board chairs are rare across U.S. public companies. That is true for the SV 150 and the S&P 100 companies, although the top 15 largest companies in the SV 150 have tended to have women board chairs more frequently than the similarly sized S&P 100 companies. A major factor in the dearth of women serving as board chairs is the fact that many CEOs also serve as chair of their board, combined with the fact that, as discussed in more detail below, women CEOs are also relatively rare.

The following graphs show the percentage of companies with a woman serving as board chair for all companies in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the top 15 of the SV 150 broken out separately), as well as for only those companies in each group that have at least one woman director, over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES WITH A WOMAN BOARD CHAIR — 1996–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Companies</th>
<th>Companies with at least 1 Woman Director</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SV 150 and S&P 100 graphs show a decrease in the percentage of companies with a woman board chair over time, with the SV Top 15 showing a slight increase in the same period. The S&P 100 shows a more pronounced decrease.

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47 See, e.g., the GMI Ratings survey referenced in footnote 27, which noted that “Female board chairs, moreover, remain rare across the US universe. Only 3.0% of S&P 500 company chairs are women, along with 2.5% of Russell 2000 board chairs. The percentage of female chairs in the full S&P 1500 has only increased 0.4 percentage points since our last report [2011], to the current level of 2.6%, with most of that change having occurred in the Midcaps.”

48 See the most recent edition of the Fenwick corporate governance survey discussed in footnote 1 for statistics regarding the frequency of combined CEOs/board chairs in the SV 150 and S&P 100.

49 See “Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team—Chief Executive Officer (CEO)” on p. 44.
Lead Director

Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley era, which kicked off a number of governance reforms, lead directors were exceedingly rare, with their emergence really commencing in the 2003 proxy season. Of companies that have a lead director, S&P 100 companies initially trailed SV 150 companies in terms of percentage of lead directors that are women but have clearly exceeded the SV 150 since the 2006 proxy season. Both sets of companies have appointed a fairly small percentage of women lead directors (in 2013, SV 150 = 6.2% and S&P 100 = 11.8%). Further, significantly affecting the percentage in the SV 150 were the 65 companies in 2013 without at least one woman director (larger numbers in prior years). Excluding companies in both groups with no women directors, the percentage of lead directors that are women in the SV 150 companies was similar to S&P 100 companies, particularly since the 2009 proxy season.

The following graphs show the percentage of companies with a woman serving as lead director for all companies in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the top 15 of the SV 150 broken out separately), as well as for only those companies in each group that have at least one woman director, over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES WITH A WOMAN LEAD DIRECTOR — 1996–2013
(Among companies that have a Lead Director)

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During the period from the 1996 through the 2002 proxy season, none of the SV 150 companies had a lead director, and the same was true for the S&P 100 for most proxy seasons (the exception was one company with a lead director in 2001).
Committee Chairs

Among the three primary committees that are common across almost all companies (audit, compensation and nominating committees), the percentage of women chairs when measured across all such committees has risen steadily in both groups of companies, particularly since the 2003 proxy season. However, throughout the survey period, that percentage has averaged about seven percentage points higher in the S&P 100 compared with the SV 150, with that spread increasing over the last three proxy seasons (S&P 100 moving from 7.3% in 1996 to 16.6% in 2010 and 19.0% in 2013; SV 150 moving from 0.4% in 1996 to 8.1% in 2010 and 8.9% in 2013). Excluding companies in both groups with no women directors, the percentage of women chairs when measured across the primary committees in the SV 150 was similar to S&P 100 companies.

Looking at the three committees separately, the two groups of companies have experienced somewhat different trends. For the S&P 100, the percentage of nominating committee chairs that are women is highest and increased most over the period (S&P 100 Audit moved from 7.5% in 1996 to 19.0% in 2013; Compensation moved from 5.3% in 1996 to 15.0% in 2013; Nominating moved from 9.0% in 1996 to 23.0% in the 2013 proxy season), while the opposite is true for the SV 150 (SV 150 Audit moved from 0.0% in 1996 to 10.0% in 2013; Compensation moved from 1.3% in 1996 to 10.1% in 2013; Nominating moved from 0.0% in 1996 to 6.8% in the 2013 proxy season).

The following graphs show the percentage of audit, compensation, nominating and other standing committee chairs that are women in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons (among those companies in each group identifying such chairs in their public filings in each such proxy season).
The following graphs show the percentage of chairs of primary committees (audit, compensation and nominating) and all committees, that are women for all companies in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the top 15 of the SV 150 broken out separately), as well as for only those companies in each group that have at least one woman director, over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN COMMITTEE CHAIRS: PRIMARY COMMITTEES — 1996–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SV Top 15</th>
<th>SV 150</th>
<th>S&amp;P 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN COMMITTEE CHAIRS: ALL COMMITTEES — 1996–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SV Top 15</th>
<th>SV 150</th>
<th>S&amp;P 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team

Executive Officers

Under applicable SEC disclosure rules, public companies are not required to provide disclosure specific to diversity in their executive teams. However, such companies are required to identify and provide limited biographical information regarding their executive officers, from which we are able to develop data on gender diversity regarding those executive officers. The rules for determining who specifically is an “executive officer” are imprecise and leave significant room for judgment by a company and its board when making that determination. The specific circumstances of companies vary quite significantly, and companies certainly differ in how they apply judgment to the “executive officer” determination in their particular circumstances. Consequently, the number of executive officers identified in public filings can vary significantly (even in companies that, when viewed externally, seem reasonably similar). For the SV 150, the number of executive officers identified per company ranges from 2 to 21, with a median of 6 (and an average of 6.5) in the 2013 proxy season. In the S&P 100, the number ranges from 3 to 24 executive officers identified per company, with a median of 11 (and an average of 11.2) in the 2013 proxy season.

During the period of the survey, the average number of women executive officers per company increased in each group of companies (SV 150 moved from an average of 0.4 to 0.8; S&P 100 moved from an average of 0.6 to 1.6). The average percentage of women executive officers, which takes into account the variable number of executive officers per company, increased meaningfully (SV 150 moved from 4.9% in 1996 to 11.5% in 2013; S&P 100 moved from 4.3% in 1996 to 14.7% in 2013). While the SV 150 initially exceeded the S&P 100 in terms of average percentage of women executive officers, the growth rate of women executive

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51 There is no analogue to Item 407(c)(2)(vi) of Regulation S-K with respect to executive officers (even at the board level, as discussed above, the disclosure requirement extends only to whether the nominating committee (or the board) has a policy with regard to the consideration of diversity in identifying director nominees, how it is implemented and how its effectiveness is assessed). While some companies disclose some diversity statistics in some contexts (e.g., outside of SEC filings, perhaps on their websites or in responses to inquiries), that is a far from universal practice, and where it does take place, the coverage and depth of that disclosure vary widely.

52 The specific requirement is in Item 401(b) of Regulation S-K (“List the names and ages of all executive officers of the registrant and all persons chosen to become executive officers; indicate all positions and offices with the registrant held by each such person; state his [or her] term of office as officer and the period during which he [or she] has served as such and describe briefly any arrangement or understanding between him [or her] and any other person(s) (naming such person) pursuant to which he [or she] was or is to be selected as an officer”).

53 See “Methodology—Executive Officers (and NEOs)” beginning on p.59 for a discussion of such determinations.

54 As discussed in the "Introduction," the size and employee base of companies in this survey vary greatly, to which could be added a great deal of variation in internal organizational complexity, geographic footprint and management philosophies involved.

55 For the top 15 of the SV 150, the number ranges from 4 to 14, a median of 9 (and an average of 8.0) in the 2013 proxy season; for the top 50, it ranges from 4 to 14, with a median of 7 (and an average of 7.4); for the middle 50, it ranges from 2 to 12, with a median of 6 (and an average of 6.3); and for the bottom 50, it ranges from 2 to 21, with a median of 5 (and an average of 5.8).

56 According to “Study: Benchmarking the Number of ‘Executive Officers’” by TheCorporateCounsel.net and LogixData, “based on disclosures pulled from the Form 10-Ks, proxy statements and glossy annual reports of all public companies that made such disclosures during 2010,” for the S&P 500, the number ranges from 1 to 31, with a median of 8 (and an average of 8.7), and for the Russell 2000 the number ranges from 1 to 27, with a median of 5 (and an average of 6.1).

57 In addition to the wide variation in the number of executive officers discussed above (including the disparity in the average number of executive officers between the SV 150 and the S&P 100), it should be noted that there was a steady decline in the average total number of executive officers per company over the course of the survey (SV 150 declined from 8.8 to 6.5; S&P 100 declined from 13.2 to 11.2). In addition, the range of the number of executive officers has narrowed significantly, particularly since the 2000 proxy season (SV 150, range of 2 to 28; S&P 100, range of 4 to 54 in the 2000 proxy season).
officers, in terms of either the average number of women executive officers per company or the average percentage of executive officers that are women, has been faster in the S&P 100 (approximately 245% growth) than in the SV 150 (approximately 135% growth) over the survey period. However, 45.3% of SV 150 companies and 16.0% of S&P 100 companies had no women executive officers in the 2013 proxy season.

While a wealth of long-term, large-scale research on the effect of women executives on company performance is not yet available, observers have hypothesized that the women who have broken through a “glass ceiling” impeding the promotion of women to the executive level and then ultimately become CEO will possess superior skills compared with male CEOs on average, leading to superior performance on objective measures for women CEOs on average. Research also suggests that the proportion of women in top management jobs tends to have positive effects on company performance. However, other research has suggested that there is no difference in stock price performance or leverage levels in public companies led by women, and that women-led technology startup companies have underperformed by some measures (although that may be a reflection of women having access to inferior opportunities).

It is important to observe that, as in companies elsewhere, there are many possible career paths leading to serving as CEO or as an executive officer of a high technology or life science company in Silicon Valley, beyond being the founder of a startup company and such career paths often start during college or


59 See, e.g., “Do women in top management affect firm performance? A panel study of 2,500 Danish firms” by Nina Smith, Valdemar Smith, and Mette Verner of the Aarhus School of Business in the International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management (2006), which also cautioned that “[t]he results show that the positive effects of women in top management strongly depend on the qualifications of female top managers.”

60 See, e.g., “Diagnosing Discrimination: Stock Returns and CEO Gender” by Justin Wolfers in the Journal of the European Economic Association (2006), which found “no systematic differences in returns to holding stock in female-headed firms,” the Strelcova paper referenced in footnote 58, which found that “female CEO run companies significantly underperform male CEO run companies in the year following the female CEO appointment; [s]tarting from the second year after the female CEO appointment no statistically significant differences in stock price performance between female CEO and male CEO run companies was observed; [and the s]tudy also does not find any statistically significant difference between the leverage levels of female CEO and male CEO run companies,” and “Sources of Financing for New Technology Firms: A Comparison by Gender” by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (July 2009), which found that women-owned high-tech firms lag behind the men-owned firms in critical performance measures (in their fourth year “women-owned firms had total revenues that were less than half of those for men-owned firms, while their profits were almost 40 percent lower; women-owned firms that had intellectual property had fewer patents, copyrights, and trademarks on average than men-owned firms; women-owned firms that had some type of intellectual property employed an average of 7.7 employees, compared with 9.7 employees for men-owned firms”).

61 There is sometimes an impression left when discussing Silicon Valley that founder-CEOs are the norm or that many of the executive officers in companies were also founders. While not carefully studied, and clearly beyond the scope of the research reported in this paper, anecdotal experience and long-time observation of Silicon Valley would suggest that it is far from the norm. It appears that most executive officers of public companies in Silicon Valley never founded a company, let alone the company at which they currently serve. The same appears to be true of public company CEOs — even when limited to only considering IPO companies. Very different sets of skills and temperament may be needed by executives, including CEOs, at different stages in the life cycle of a company. While a founder may have the skills necessary for the very early stage of a company, they may lack those necessary as the company develops further, often resulting in the hiring of more experienced executives to move the company through the next phase (this is often iterative, with those executives being replaced by executives having skills appropriate to later phases). Analyses that focus solely on founders may miss the full picture of how Silicon Valley companies develop.
graduate school and stretch over many years before arriving at the executive officer level.\textsuperscript{62} One contributing factor to the lower numbers of women serving as executive officers for the companies in the SV 150 is scale, both in terms of the relatively smaller size of the executive management teams, which means there are fewer opportunities for advancement to the executive officer level, and in terms of the smaller employee bases at SV 150 companies from which to develop and promote women internally to an executive officer position. Other factors that may contribute to much, but perhaps not all, of the relative dearth of women serving as executive officers for the high technology and life science companies in the SV 150 (many of which are common to companies outside of Silicon Valley and interact with each other in complex ways) include, among others, gender differences in:

- education levels, particularly historically;\textsuperscript{63}
- areas of education, particularly in science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) majors, MBAs and other subjects relevant to Silicon Valley, as well as perseverance in such educations, particularly among those pursuing specialized skills or elite education;\textsuperscript{63}
- career field or industry selection, particularly among those with specialized skills or elite education;\textsuperscript{63}
- risk-taking on the job and in careers, as well as pursuing Silicon Valley entrepreneurship;\textsuperscript{63}
- the Silicon Valley ecosystem beyond the high technology and life science companies themselves (including venture capital firms, investment banks, law firms, accounting firms and others);\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{62} According to “Want To Be A CEO? Stay Put” by Wendy Todaro in Forbes (March 31, 2003), “across industries, the average [rookie] CEO is 50 years old upon taking office.” Similarly, “The Changing Path to Corporate Leadership” by Matthew Davis of the National Bureau of Economic Research noted that “the average age of executives — high-level figures who include company presidents, chief executive officers, chief financial officers, and senior vice presidents, among others — was 56 in 2001.” The Spencer Stuart report referenced in footnote 37 notes that the average age of S&P 500 company CEOs was 56.5 in 2012. But see “Young CEOs: Are They Up to the Job?” by Spencer Ante and Joann Lublin in The Wall Street Journal (February 7, 2012), which noted that “[e]ight of the 42 technology and Internet companies that held initial public offerings in the U.S. in 2011 were led by CEOs who were under 40 at the time, according to a review of data from capital-markets data firm Dealogic.”

\textsuperscript{63} See the materials referenced in “Additional Resources” and elsewhere in these footnotes for information and analysis related to, and underlying, these factors. See also “Out of the Loop in Silicon Valley” by Claire Cain Miller in The New York Times (April 17, 2010), which covers the subject fairly broadly and notes that “[j]ust 1 percent of girls taking the SAT in 2009 said they wanted to major in computer or information sciences, compared with 5 percent of boys, according to the College Board. Only 18 percent of college students graduating with computer science degrees in 2008 were women, down from 37 percent in 1985. … In a study of 493 undergraduate engineering majors’ intentions to continue with their major, men tended to stick with their studies as long as they completed the coursework, while women did so only if they earned high grades. … Even women who soldier through demanding computer science and engineering programs in college don’t subsequently create tech start-ups on a par with their male counterparts. … 56 percent of women with technical jobs leave their work midway through their careers, double the turnover rate for men. Twenty percent of them leave the workforce entirely, and an additional 31 percent take nontechnical jobs — suggesting that child-rearing isn’t necessarily the primary reason women move on. Many are pushed to pursue supervisory and management jobs instead of ‘individual contributor’ jobs involving deep technical expertise. … For women who choose to leave their jobs to raise children, returning to technical careers after a leave is harder because technology changes so quickly and skills can become rapidly outdated. Some women also leave promising jobs earlier than men because they discover that the workplaces themselves can be lonely. … Networks are crucial for fund-raising, because most investors don’t look at pitches that come over the transom. Since an overwhelming majority of venture capitalists are men and have gotten to the firms via start-ups or business schools — both places where women are underrepresented — women have a harder time gaining access to the Valley’s boys club, analysts say.” But, see also “Report: 60 Percent of Tech Jobs Created This Year Filled by Women” by Levi Sumagaysay in SiliconBeat (November 12, 2013), which also provides statistics for gender participation in net newly created jobs going back to 2004.
Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team (continued)

- the effect of societal and cultural factors in the United States and in the many countries around the world from which Silicon Valley draws that affect education or career pursuit;\textsuperscript{63} and

- career interruption, including for child rearing, which may have a greater impact on entrepreneurship or at the professional/executive level.\textsuperscript{63}

It is very difficult to separate the interplay of these and other factors. For example, research has shown that “women-owned firms had a significantly lower probability of using outside equity as a financing source at startup.”\textsuperscript{64} But that same research also found that “older owners, owners who worked longer hours, owners with higher levels of education, and owners who had previous startup experience had a significantly higher probability of using outside equity.”\textsuperscript{65} Obviously, gender differences may underlie each of these factors, which may contribute to the gender disparity in equity fundraising. To the extent that founders are a source of public company CEOs, these differences will obviously lead to increased gender disparity.

\textsuperscript{63} See the text of footnote 63 on the prior page.
\textsuperscript{64} See the Kauffman Foundation study referenced in footnote 60.
\textsuperscript{65} The Kauffman Foundation study referenced in footnote 60 also observed that “[s]ome of the differences between women- and men-owned firms at startup can be explained by differences in financing strategy. … Men’s greater reliance on outside equity to fund their firms may suggest that they were more open to sharing ownership and control with outsiders. Alternatively, it may suggest that men have greater access to networks that provide investors willing to supply external equity.” Further, that study surveyed the limited preexisting research touching on the subjects of women’s experiences in the technology industry and financing strategies of women-owned technology companies, including referencing research that “noted that women entrepreneurs may lack the managerial experience required by equity investors if they are unable to gain human capital in the form of executive or technical management. The authors also observed that the venture capital industry is a relatively closed and male-dominated network. There are comparatively few women equity investors, and women typically are excluded from decision-making roles in venture capital firms. All these factors conspire to make it more difficult for women to gain access to networks that could provide equity capital.”
Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team (continued)

The following graphs show the average number and the average percentage of executive officers that are women in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the SV 150 broken down by the top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies) over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

AVERAGE NUMBER OF WOMEN EXECUTIVE OFFICERS — 1996–2013

AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN EXECUTIVE OFFICERS — 1996–2013
Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team (continued)

The following graphs show the percentage of companies with at least one woman executive officer and the distributions by number of women executive officers among the companies in each group during the 2013 proxy season.

WOMEN EXECUTIVE OFFICERS DISTRIBUTION — 2013 PROXY SEASON

SV 150 2013

% of companies with at least 1 woman executive officer

54.7%

S&P 100 2013

% of companies with at least 1 woman executive officer

84.0%

Women executive officers distribution (% of all companies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of women executive officers</th>
<th>% of companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>45.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Women executive officers distribution (% of all companies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of women executive officers</th>
<th>% of companies</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of companies

# of women executive officers
Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team (continued)

The following graph shows the distribution of women executive officers by number of women executive officers at each executive management team size among companies in each group during the 2013 proxy season.

DISTRIBUTIONS BY TOTAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS vs. NUMBER OF WOMEN EXECUTIVE OFFICERS — 2013 PROXY SEASON

**S&P 100 (100 COMPANIES) vs. SV 150 (150 COMPANIES)**

[Graph showing distribution of women executive officers by total executive officers and women executive officers for S&P 100, SV 150, and both groups.]

Area of circle indicates number of companies with x total executives and y women executives. Number in circle indicates number of companies.
Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team (continued)

The following graphs show the trend in the distribution by number and percentage of women executive officers in each group over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons (showing both the median number or percentage and the cutoffs for the deciles with the most women executive officers).

**DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN EXECUTIVE OFFICERS — 1996–2013**

**Women Executive Officers: Numbers**  
1996-2013

**SV 150**

**S&P 100**

**Women Executive Officers: Percentages**  
1996-2013

**SV 150**

**S&P 100**
“Named Executive Officers”

SEC rules require that each public company identify and provide detailed disclosure and analysis regarding the compensation paid to the company’s principal executive officer (generally CEO), principal financial officer (generally CFO) and three most highly compensated executive officers other than those specified individuals, in each case as of the end of the most recently completed fiscal year. The term of art “named executive officers” (or “NEOs”) is somewhat confusingly used in SEC rules (and consequently by practitioners) to refer to such individuals, despite the fact that other executive officers are in fact named in the proxy statement and other SEC filings. This report continues such usage.

We have analyzed the gender diversity of NEOs, because this group represents to a degree the executive officers that each company considers most important (somewhat in the vein that the company is putting its money where its mouth is)—and reviews of diversity often focus on this group. However, it should be noted that this is an imperfect indicator, potentially deeply imperfect in individual cases. There are major idiosyncrasies in the rules for determining “most highly compensated” that can significantly skew
Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team (continued)

...membership. Even where such idiosyncrasies do not have a material impact, there are also other reasons why an executive officer might be “underpaid” relative to their importance and value in the eyes of the company’s CEO and/or board. In addition, the requirement in the rule to include not only the CEO and CFO as of the end of the fiscal year, but also any other person that held either of those positions during the fiscal year can also skew NEO membership.

Subject to these meaningful qualifications, our data shows that during the period of the survey, the average number of women NEOs per company increased in each group of companies (SV 150 moved from an average 0.1 to 0.6; S&P 100 moved from 0.1 to 0.5). Taking into account the variable number of NEOs per company, the average percentage of women NEOs increased meaningfully (SV 150 moved from 1.5% in 1996 to 10.7% in 2013; S&P 100 moved from 2.1% in 1996 to 8.9% in the 2013 proxy season). While the S&P 100 initially slightly exceeded the SV 150 in terms of average percentage of women NEOs, the growth rate of women NEOs, in terms of either the average number of women NEOs per company or the average percentage of NEOs that are women, has been faster in the SV 150 (approximately 570% growth) than in the S&P 100 (approximately 69% growth).
340% growth) over the survey period. However, 56.0% of SV 150 companies and 61.0% of S&P 100 companies had no women NEOs in the 2013 proxy season.\textsuperscript{72}

When viewed over time, it does not appear that the high technology and life science companies of the SV 150 are any less likely than the large public companies of the S&P 100 to have women NEOs. In the current year are, they more likely to have them (and more likely to have multiple women NEOs).\textsuperscript{73} There also does not appear to be any meaningful correlation between the percentage of women NEOs and company size.\textsuperscript{74}

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\textsuperscript{72} This appears to be representative of companies generally. See, e.g., the UC Davis Graduate School of Management study of the 400 largest public companies in California (“[a]lmost two-thirds (63.3%) of California’s 400 largest public companies have no women among the highest-paid executives; [a]another 29.5% of the state’s companies have only one woman among the highest-paid executives; [and o]nly 7.3% [of] companies have two or more women among the highest-paid executives”) and The Boston Club census of the 100 largest public companies in Massachusetts (finding that only “[t]hirty of the 100 companies have at least one woman among their most highly compensated executives”), each referenced in footnote 27.

\textsuperscript{73} The UC Davis Graduate School of Management study referenced in footnote 27 suggests a more nuanced view of the contribution of industry to the inclusion of women among “highest paid executives,” finding that “pharmaceuticals” was the highest (50%) and “technology software” and “semiconductors” were the lowest (24% and 22%, respectively), with “technology hardware” in between (34%), in terms of percentage of companies in an industry with one or more women “highest paid executives” (also providing information for industries identified as “health care,” “financial services,” “consumer goods,” “utilities and telecommunications” and “energy, materials and industrials”).

\textsuperscript{74} The UC Davis Graduate School of Management study referenced in footnote 27 reached a similar conclusion (“[w]hile the largest firms tend to have the highest percentage of women directors, there is no discernible positive relationship between market capitalization and the percentage of highest-paid women executives; [t]he three largest size categories (with market capitalization averaging $2.9 billion and above) have the three lowest average percentages of highest-paid women executives, ranging between 6.4% and 7.5%; [and s]ix of these companies (5.0%) have two or more highest-paid women executives”).
The following graphs show the average number and the average percentage of “named executive officers” that are women in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the SV 150 broken down by the top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies) over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

AVERAGE NUMBER OF WOMEN NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS (NEOS) — 1996–2013

AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS (NEOS) — 1996–2013
The following graph shows the ratio of average representation of women among “named executive officers” to the average representation of women among all executive officers overall in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

RATIO OF WOMEN NEO REPRESENTATION TO WOMEN EXECUTIVE REPRESENTATION — 1996–2013
(Average Percentage of Women NEOs divided by Average Percentage of Women Executives)

The following graph shows the percentage of companies in each group with women representing at least a variety of minimum threshold percentages of “named executive officers” during the 2013 proxy season.

WOMEN NEO REPRESENTATION: SV 150 vs. S&P 100 — 2013 PROXY SEASON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of Companies</th>
<th>SV 150</th>
<th>S&amp;P 100</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0% with 10% or more Women NEOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>10% with 20% or more Women NEOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>20% with 25% or more Women NEOs</td>
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<td>30% with 33.33% or more Women NEOs</td>
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<td>40% with 40% or more Women NEOs</td>
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<td>50% with 50% or more Women NEOs</td>
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</table>
Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team (continued)

The following graphs show the trend in the distribution by number and percentage of women named executive officers in each group over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons (showing both the median number or percentage and the cutoffs for the deciles with the most women named executive officers).

DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN NAMED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS — 1996–2013

Women Named Executive Officers: Numbers
1996-2013

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SV 150</th>
<th>S&amp;P 100</th>
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<tbody>
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Women Named Executive Officers: Percentages
1996-2013

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<th></th>
<th>SV 150</th>
<th>S&amp;P 100</th>
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<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>54%</td>
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Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team (continued)

Chief Executive Officer (CEO)

The large public companies of the S&P 100 have tended to more frequently have a woman serving as CEO than the high technology and life science companies of the SV 150 (S&P 100 = 6.0% and SV 150 = 2.7% in the 2013 proxy season), although both groups have very few women serving as CEOs.75 Since CEOs often serve on their own company’s board and are often sought as board members for other companies, the small number of women CEOs is a factor that contributes to the relatively low number of women serving on boards of directors. In addition, CEOs exert a great deal of influence on the recruitment of new board members and executives to their company. To the extent that women CEOs are more likely to recruit other women for those roles or have more women in their network to refer for those roles, the scarcity of women CEOs further contributes to the relative infrequency of women on boards and on executive management teams.76

The following graphs show the percentage of companies with a woman serving as the chief executive officer in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the SV 150 broken down by the top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies) over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons (among those companies in each group identifying such an executive in their public filings in each such proxy season).

PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES WITH A WOMAN CEO — 1996–2013

The companies of the S&P 100 and the SV 150 do not appear to be outliers in this regard. See, e.g., “More Women Are Primed to Land CEO Roles (In the U.S., a Strong Pipeline of Female Senior Executives Means a Larger Pool Eyed by Recruiters)” by Joann Lublin and Kelly Eggers in The Wall Street Journal (April 30, 2012) (“The ranks of female chief executives remain thin, with women in the top spot at just 35 Fortune 1000 companies”) and the UC Davis Graduate School of Management study referenced in footnote 27 (“Of the 400 largest public companies in California, 13 [3.3%] are led by women chief executive officers”) — bearing in mind that Silicon Valley companies made up roughly a quarter of the companies covered in that study (which also suggested that industry was a contributing factor) and the Spencer Stuart report referenced in footnote 37, which found that women represented 4.1% of CEOs in the S&P 500.

E.g., according to the Spencer Stuart report referenced in footnote 37, “[i]n S&P 500 companies led by women, 29% of all directors are women; excluding the CEO, the percentage is 22%. In companies with a male CEO, the average is 17%” (no statistic excluding the male CEO was provided).
The following graphs show the respective imbalances in the percentage of executive officers, named executive officers, board members, committee members and committee chairs that are women among companies with a woman serving as CEO compared with companies with a man serving as CEO in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 during the 2013 proxy season.

GENDER IMBALANCES: SV 150 VS. S&P 100 — 2013 PROXY SEASON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male CEO</th>
<th>Female CEO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executives</strong> (not including CEO)</td>
<td><strong>Executives</strong> (not including CEO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Directors</strong> (not including CEO)</td>
<td><strong>Directors</strong> (not including CEO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEOs</strong> (not including CEO)</td>
<td><strong>NEOs</strong> (not including CEO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Committee Members</strong></td>
<td><strong>Committee Members</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Committee Chairs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Committee Chairs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
President/Top Operations Executive (separate from CEO)

The large public companies of the S&P 100 had a woman serving as the president (separate from the CEO) and/or the top operations executive (often COO) slightly more frequently than the high technology and life science companies of the SV 150 (S&P 100 = 12.5% and SV 150 = 9.6% in the 2013 proxy season). However, both groups have very few women serving in these roles — although women serve in these roles more frequently than they serve as CEO. A company’s president or senior operations executive is often a potential successor to the CEO (or candidate for outside CEO positions). Consequently, the relatively low number of women serving in these roles contributes to the paucity of women CEOs, as well as to the relatively low number of women serving on boards of directors — although the increasing frequency over time and relative to the frequency of women serving as CEO suggests that gains may be made in the number of women CEOs and board members in coming years.

The following graph shows the percentage of companies with a woman serving as the president or top operations executive (that is separate from the CEO) in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons (among those companies in each group identifying such an executive in their public filings in each such proxy season).

PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES WITH A WOMAN PRESIDENT OR COO/TOP OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE — 1996–2013

For purposes of this survey, we have counted only the president and/or the top operations executive where they are separate from the CEO. Many companies combine the roles. The data for CEO discussed above includes such combined roles.

As with CEOs, the companies of the S&P 100 and the SV 150 do not appear to be outliers in this regard. See, e.g., the UC Davis Graduate School of Management study referenced in footnote 27, which found 18 women serving as president and/or chief operating officer in 2012 (down from 20 in 2011) of the 400 largest public companies in California.

A similar observation is made in The Wall Street Journal article referenced in footnote 75.
Chief Financial Officer (CFO)

The high technology and life science companies of the SV 150 had a woman serving as CFO\(^{80}\) slightly more frequently than the large public companies of the S&P 100 (SV 150 = 13.3% and S&P 100 = 10.1% in the 2013 proxy season). Over the period of the survey, companies in both groups have been more likely to have a woman serving as CFO than either CEO or president/top operating executive,\(^{81}\) although both groups still have relatively few women serving as CFOs.

The following graph shows the percentage of companies with a woman serving as the chief financial officer in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 (and with the SV 150 broken down by the top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies) over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons (among those companies in each group identifying such an executive in their public filings in each such proxy season).

**PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES WITH A WOMAN CFO — 1996–2013**

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\(^{80}\) Includes the top financial officer identified, if no CFO was identified.

\(^{81}\) Similar results have been seen in other studies. See, e.g., the UC Davis Graduate School of Management study referenced in footnote 27 (“Of the 400 largest public companies in California, [the] CFO category has the most women, with 47 [11.8%]”). However, in the 2013 proxy season, the percentage of presidents/top operating executives that are women exceeded the percentage of CFOs that are women in S&P 100 companies for the first time. Whether this develops into an ongoing trend will be of interest in coming years.
Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team (continued)

General Counsel (GC)

Over the course of the survey, the high technology and life science companies of the SV 150 have historically had a woman serving as the senior legal executive, usually the general counsel (GC), meaningfully more frequently than the large public companies of the S&P 100. However, the growth rate has been faster in the S&P 100 companies during that period, largely closing the gap (SV 150 = 23.1% and S&P 100 = 21.1% in the 2013 proxy season). Among SV 150 companies, the GC has been the senior executive role most likely to be filled by a woman during the survey period.

The following graph shows the percentage of companies with a woman serving as the general counsel in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons (among those companies in each group identifying such an executive in their public filings in each such proxy season).

PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES WITH A WOMAN GENERAL COUNSEL — 1996–2013

82 The percentage of GCs that are women in the SV 150 and the S&P 100 are somewhat higher than the 18.9% of GCs that are women in the Fortune 1000 according to the Minority Corporate Counsel Association’s 14th Annual General Counsel Survey (September 2013). The percentage in the S&P 100 is similar to the 21.0% of GCs that are women in the Fortune 500, while the percentage in the SV 150 clearly exceeds that group’s percentage as well as the 16.8% of GCs that are women in the Fortune 501-1000 companies, according to that survey.

83 To a degree, this may be a function of the relatively higher proportion of women who pursue legal education versus education in fields that lead to other executive officer positions in Silicon Valley. See “Additional Resources—Education” on pp. 63–64. These studies show that in 2009–2010, women were 47.2% of law students, 36.9% of MBAs earned and only 18% of all computer and information sciences undergraduate degrees earned. The higher number of women GCs may also be symptomatic of the challenges that leading law firms have in retaining top-performing women, particularly in corporate transactional and high-stakes litigation practices. Partnership track in a leading law firm is often the primary alternative to choosing an in-house career path for such women in Silicon Valley (the career paths of large public company GCs outside of Silicon Valley appear to have a much greater degree of variation — including many arriving via government service). In-house counsel roles at public companies and fast rising private companies can offer an attractive alternative to such women in terms of both autonomy and compensation, as well as in career-path flexibility. Anecdotal experience suggests that women also serve fairly frequently as a company’s top human resources executive (perhaps more frequently than as the general counsel or top marketing officer). However, such officers are infrequently included among the executive officers of public companies comprising these indices and were not tracked for purposes of the survey.
Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team (continued)

Top Technology/Engineering/R&D Executive

It is difficult to compare the frequency of women serving as the top technology/engineering/research and development executive\(^{84}\) between the high technology and life science companies of the SV 150 and the large public companies of the S&P 100. While this is often a central, leading role at SV 150 companies, it is less common at, and appears to have less importance to, S&P 100 companies — although its importance and centrality do appear to be increasing in that group.\(^{85}\) Subject to those limitations, during the course of the survey, women have served as the top technology/engineering/research and development executive at similar (low) levels, although the percentage in the S&P 100 has exceeded the percentage in the SV 150 in recent years (S&P 100 = 10.0% and SV 150 = 5.0% in the 2013 proxy season). There appears to be an upward trend in women in these roles in the S&P 100, while the data for the SV 150 does not suggest such a trend.

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\(^{84}\) This role may carry the title of CTO, VP of Engineering or VP of Research and Development among others. These roles are often thought of as being quite distinct. However, these terms are used with a wide degree of meaning, with CTO often being the broadest sometimes also encompassing a sales-focused or product development role. For purposes of this survey, the roles have been grouped together.

\(^{85}\) A much wider range of titles has been counted in the S&P 100 for purposes of this survey. For example, in the S&P 100, we have included chief information officers (CIOs). CIOs are generally a much less central role in the SV 150 and are meaningfully dissimilar to CTO or vice president of engineering or of research and development in Silicon Valley companies (often not thought of as one of the most senior executive roles).
Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team (continued)

Top Sales Executive

Comparisons of the frequency of women serving as the top sales executive between the high technology and life science companies of the SV 150 and the large public companies of the S&P 100 are difficult. This is often a central leading role at SV 150 companies, where revenue growth is a principal driver of valuation, organizations are smaller and organizational structures are much less complex. S&P 100 companies are much less likely to identify a top sales executive among their executive officers.\(^{86}\) Subject to those limitations, during the course of the survey, women have served as the top sales executive somewhat more frequently in the SV 150 than in the S&P 100 (SV 150 = 11.1% and S&P 100 = 6.7% in the 2013 proxy season). There appears to be a steady upward trend in women in these roles in the SV 150, while the data for the S&P 100 does not clearly suggest such a trend.\(^{87}\) The increase of women in such roles in the S&P 100 in recent years may develop into a clearer trend over time.

The following graph shows the percentage of companies with a woman serving as the top sales executive in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons (among those companies in each group identifying such an executive in their public filings in each such proxy season).

PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES WITH A WOMAN TOP SALES EXECUTIVE — 1996–2013

\(^{86}\) During the course of the survey, the SV 150 companies have identified generally five to ten times more top sales executives among their executive officers than have the S&P 100 companies.

\(^{87}\) The volatility of the percentage of top sales executives that are women in the S&P 100 appears to be a function of both the very low number of top sales executives identified among their executive officers and changes in the makeup of that index.
Top Marketing Executive (separate from Sales)

Over the course of the survey period, the large companies of the S&P 100 have been substantially more likely to have a woman serving as the top marketing executive than the high technology and life science companies of the SV 150, although both groups have shown substantial growth in the percentage of women serving in such roles (S&P 100 grew from 5.9% to 40.0%; SV 150 grew from 9.5% to 18.2%). In the S&P 100, the top marketing executive has been by far the senior executive role most likely to be filled by a woman during the survey period. In the SV 150, the frequency of women serving as top marketing executive has grown near that of general counsel.

The following graph shows the percentage of companies with a woman serving as the top marketing executive (that is separate from the top sales executive) in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons (among those companies in each group identifying such an executive in their public filings in each such proxy season).

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88 For purposes of this survey, we have counted only the top marketing executive where they are separate from the top sales executive. A number of companies combine the roles. The data for top sales executive discussed above includes such combined roles.

89 This may be a function of women disproportionately choosing marketing as a discipline within business education. See, e.g., “What Women Do With Their M.B.A.s” by Jenna Goudreau in Forbes (June 21, 2010), which noted that “22% of women seek marketing and advertising jobs with their M.B.A.s. Management consulting positions drew in 20% of female grads and financial services attracted 11%,” and “Fewer Women Are Choosing College Business Programs” by Erin Zlomek in Bloomberg BusinessWeek (March 22, 2013), which noted that “In Bloomberg Businessweek’s survey, women were 1.3 times more likely than men to concentrate on health-care management and policy and international business. They were 1.6 times more likely to concentrate in marketing. Men, on the other hand, outnumbered women 2 to 1 in finance, entrepreneurship, information management, and environmental policy and management. Accounting, general management, and e-commerce had near gender parity.” To some degree, the volatility of the percentage of top marketing executives who are women in the S&P 100 is a function of both the very low number of top sales executives identified among their executive officers and changes in the makeup of that index. Anecdotal experience suggests that women also serve fairly frequently as a company’s top human resources executive (perhaps more frequently than as the top marketing officer or general counsel). However, such officers are infrequently included among the executive officers of public companies included in these indices and were not tracked for purposes of the survey.
Top Corporate/Business Development Executive

The percentage of women serving as the top corporate/business development executive\(^9\) in the large companies of the S&P 100 generally exceeded the percentage in the high technology and life science companies of the SV 150 during the period of the survey. However, both groups have shown significant volatility in the percentage of women serving in such roles, and the SV 150 companies passed the S&P 100 companies recently (SV 150 = 14.8%; S&P 100 = 10.7%). It is not clear that the data for either group of companies represents a trend.\(^9\)

The following graph shows the percentage of companies with a woman serving as the top corporate development or business development executive in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons (among those companies in each group identifying such an executive in their public filings in each such proxy season).

PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES WITH A WOMAN TOP CORPORATE/BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT EXECUTIVE — 1996–2013

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These roles are often thought of as being quite distinct. However, these terms are used with a wide degree of meaning, with “business development” in particular being expanded to encompass much of what is meant by corporate development. In a number of instances, the roles are explicitly combined (e.g., “Senior Vice President of Corporate and Business Development”). For purposes of this survey, the roles have been grouped together.

To some degree, the volatility of the percentage of top corporate/business executives that are women in both groups is a function of both the relatively low number of top corporate/business development executives identified among their executive officers and changes in the makeup of each index.
Conclusion

As discussed in the “Introduction,” for a number of years, and particularly recently, there has been media coverage and commentary, as well as much discussion among participants in the Silicon Valley ecosystem, about the relative lack of gender diversity here. Much of this discussion has been based on anecdotal observation or relatively limited statistical information. Commentary that is unduly negative or pessimistic, even if well intended, runs the risk of discouraging talented women in all disciplines from initiating, pursuing or maintaining careers in the Silicon Valley high technology and life science industries. This would be a real loss for Silicon Valley and all those who benefit from its innovations and economic contributions. While the data presented in this survey shows that women are significantly underrepresented relative to their percentage of the general population and as a percentage of the workforce (and in a number of ways when compared with their percentage in very large public companies), it also shows that the past two decades (and, in particular, the last four years since the depth of the financial crisis) has been a time of progress for women in leadership roles in Silicon Valley public companies.

The following graphs show the average percentage of board members that are women and the average percentage of executive officers that are women in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 over the period from the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons.

92 See, e.g., the articles discussed in footnote 4.

93 A similar point has been made in “Closing The Tech Industry’s Gender Gap Requires Better Data” by Catherine Bracy on NPR’s All Tech Considered blog (June 25, 2013) and “Women in Tech: One Look At The Numbers” by Levi Sumagaysay in SiliconBeat (November 8, 2012), which also references some initial numbers for women engineers in technology companies based on an effort initiated by Tracy Chou in a blog post titled “Where Are The Numbers?” (October 21, 2013).

94 It also suggests caution when considering the data for any one point in time or trends for a relatively short period (including, for example, the observation in the last parenthetical in the sentence). The data may also suggest that periods of particularly strong growth in Silicon Valley may have been accompanied by periods of especially good opportunity for women.
Conclusion (continued)

The following graphs show the percentage of board and executive leadership positions that are held by women in each of the SV 150 and the S&P 100 in the 1996 proxy season compared with the percentage in the 2013 proxy season.

PERCENTAGE OF TOP POSITIONS FILLED BY WOMEN: 1996 vs. 2013

Silicon Valley companies—from startups to very large public companies—whose customers and users are often a diverse array of men and women from across the nation and globally (this is especially the case for Internet businesses),\(^{95}\) need teams and leadership that can create and thrive in diverse environments addressing diverse needs.

\(^{95}\) See “Why Women Rule The Internet” by Aileen Lee, Partner at Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, in TechCrunch (March 20, 2011).
Conclusion (continued)

Diversity, including gender diversity, at the executive officer and board levels of corporate leadership (and at all levels of an organization) may provide a number of potential benefits, including:

- access to a significant part of the potential relevant talent pool that can contribute to and lead in a variety of technical and other functional areas;
- unique and tangible contributions, resulting from different perspectives, experiences, concerns and sensibilities, in product development, marketing, customer relations, mentoring and employee relations in a world of diverse customers and workforces;
- the potential for richer discussion and debate at the executive and board level (and at other levels of management) that may ultimately increase effectiveness in their decision-making and advising functions;
- executive teams and boards with diverse backgrounds increase the likelihood that the perspectives and concerns of often-ignored constituencies are represented in discussions, while at the same time reducing the risk of “groupthink”; and
- signaling to various constituencies, including employees at all levels, customers, communities, regulators and other government actors, and the public, about a company’s values.

As discussed above, major contributors to the difference in gender diversity measures between the high technology and life science companies of the SV 150 and the large public companies of the S&P 100 appear to be the difference in scale between the companies in the two groups and the concentration of technology companies in the SV 150, which, as a sector, appears to have relatively less gender diversity irrespective of geography. A wide array of factors contributes to the under-participation of women in the technology sector, and the relative lack of gender diversity at the most senior levels of leadership in public companies often reflects conditions that existed and individual decisions that were made 20 or more years ago.

As anyone who lives and works in the high technology and life science industries in Silicon Valley can readily attest, Silicon Valley is quite diverse in terms of ethnicity and culture as well as in many other ways, drawing talent from across the United States and around the world. And, as a general matter, Silicon Valley companies embrace open-mindedness and meritocracy as core values and are interested in attracting the best, most talented workforce possible, in the belief that it is essential to the success of their businesses. We hope that the information in this survey, and the many resources to which it refers, will spur and inform additional thought and discussion among the participants and leaders in the Silicon Valley ecosystem.

96 See the discussion on pp. 6–7 and 9 in “Gender Diversity on the Board of Directors” and on pp. 30–32 and 36 in “Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team.”

97 See, e.g., the breakdown for technology companies in The Boston Club study referenced in footnote 27 as well as the Spencer Stuart report referenced in footnote 29.

98 See the materials referenced in “Additional Resources” and elsewhere in these footnotes for information and analysis related to, and underlying, these factors.
Conclusion (continued)

In addition to the endeavors internal to companies and initiatives nationally and in California to advance gender and other diversity, there are a number of organizations and efforts directed at increasing gender diversity in Silicon Valley over time, including among others:

- **Watermark**, a “non-profit membership and development organization” that helps “top executive women accelerate their careers and tap into the power of networking with other top women;”

- **Astia Silicon Valley**, a “global not-for-profit organization that propels women’s full participation as entrepreneurs and leaders in high-growth businesses, fueling innovation and driving economic growth;”

- **Anita Borg Institute for Women and Technology**, a non-profit organization that seeks to “increase the impact of women on all aspects of technology, and increase the positive impact of technology on the world’s women;”

- **Women 2.0**, a media company at the intersection of women, entrepreneurship and technology” that offers “content, community and conferences for aspiring and current innovators in technology;”

- **Sheryl Sandberg’s “Lean In” campaign**, a non-profit organization “committed to offering women the ongoing inspiration and support to help them achieve their goals,” that seeks to develop an active and supportive community for women, offers a “library of free online lectures on topics including leadership and communication” and encourages the organization of “small peer groups that meet regularly to learn and share together;”

- **The Club**, “an organization dedicated to helping women accelerate their leadership journeys by providing an environment that inspires and tools that empower;”

- **CodeChix**, “a non-profit public benefit organization run by local women developers for local women developers” to “educate, promote and mentor female developers, engineers and students;” and

- **ChIPs**, a non-profit corporation with the mission of supporting, educating and promoting the advancement, development and retention of women in patent- and intellectual property-related fields.

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99 E.g., the National Center for Women & Information Technology, Catalyst and the Thirty Percent Coalition.

100 E.g., the Diverse Director DataSource (3D), which the California Public Employees’ Retirement System and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System commissioned GMI Ratings to create (see the GMI Ratings survey referenced in footnote 27).
Methodology

Group Makeup

We collected the gender diversity data presented in this report in connection with our review of the corporate governance practices of the companies included in the Standard & Poor’s 100 Index (S&P 100) and the high technology and life science companies included in the Silicon Valley 150 Index (SV 150). The makeup of the indices has changed over time as determined by their publishers, with the SV 150 makeup being updated generally once annually and the S&P 100 changing more frequently. For analytical purposes, companies are included in the survey if they appeared in the relevant index as determined as of the most recent calendar year-end. Further, in past years, to focus the survey on the industries most relevant to Silicon Valley, companies were excluded from the SV 150 data set for purposes of the survey if they were not primarily in the high technology or life science industries (broadly interpreted). To some degree, the

101 See footnote 1.
102 Standard & Poor’s has stated that “[t]he S&P 100 consists of 100 companies selected from the S&P 500. To be included, the companies should be among the largest and most established companies in the S&P 500, and must have listed options. Sector balance is considered in the selection of companies for the S&P 100.” (Standard & Poor’s states that “[t]he S&P 500 focuses on the large-cap sector of the market; however, since it includes a significant portion of the total value of the market, it also represents the market; [c]ompanies in the S&P 500 are considered leading companies in leading industries” and “[c]onstituents of the S&P 100 are selected for sector balance and represent over 60% of the market capitalization of the S&P 500 and almost 45% of the market capitalization of the U.S. equity markets.”)
103 In the past, the San Jose Mercury News had stated that “[t]he Silicon Valley 150 ranks [public] companies headquartered in Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, southern San Mateo and southern Alameda counties [in California] on the basis of worldwide revenue for the most recent available four quarters ended on or near [the most recent December 31].” However, in recognition of the continued geographic spread of high technology and life science companies beyond the traditional Silicon Valley area, beginning in the 2012 proxy season, the San Jose Mercury News expanded the definition for purposes of the index to “include [the entirety of] the five core Bay Area counties: Santa Clara, San Mateo, San Francisco, Alameda and Contra Costa.” (According to local lore, the term “Silicon Valley” was coined in 1971 to describe the concentration of semiconductor companies in what was then the northern portion of Santa Clara County. The term has since expanded to include all technology and life science companies and their geographic spread in the region.) For a discussion of the most recent SV 150 index list and the change in geographical area and its history, see “O’Brien: Welcome to the new and expanded Silicon Valley” (San Jose Mercury News, April 22, 2012). The most recent determination of the makeup of the SV 150, based on the revenues of public companies in Silicon Valley for the most recent available four quarters ended on or near December 31, 2012, was announced by the San Jose Mercury News on April 21, 2013. That group was used for purposes of the 2013 proxy season in this report. The San Jose Mercury News subsequently published a correction noting that the SV 150 (as published) had “omitted Aviat Networks of Santa Clara. The company relocated its headquarters … from North Carolina in 2010. It had sales of $471.6 million during the four quarters ended Dec. 31, 2012, and would have ranked 79 on the list.” As Aviat Networks was not included in the original publication of the SV 150, it was similarly excluded from the SV 150 data set analyzed in this report.
104 The constituents of the Standard & Poor’s 100 (S&P 100) Index are now determined by S&P/Dow Jones Indices LLC (a subsidiary of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. that was originally launched by Standard & Poor’s) and the constituents of the Silicon Valley 150 Index (SV 150) are determined by the San Jose Mercury News (part of the Bay Area News Group, a MediaNews Group company).
105 However, while changes are more frequent, Standard & Poor’s has noted that “in past years, turnover among stocks in the S&P 100 has been even lower than the turnover in the S&P 500.” Given the relative rapidity of acquisitions and the volatility of the technology business, constituent turnover in the SV 150 is somewhat greater than that of the S&P 100 in terms of the number of companies changing.
106 I.e., the Fenwick & West survey for the 2012 proxy season included companies constituent in the S&P 100 as of December 31, 2011 and constituent in the SV 150 as published on April 22, 2012, based on “the most recent available four quarters ended on or near December 31, 2011.”
107 E.g., for the 2011 proxy season, the following companies were excluded from the SV 150 data set for purposes of the survey (in order of rank within the index): Franklin Resources (14), Con-Way (17), Robert Half (25), Granite Construction (38), West Marine (66), California Water (74), Essex Property (79), SJW (105), Financial Engines (138), Coast Distribution (141) and Mission West (142). However, beginning with the 2012 proxy season, the San Jose Mercury News removed all of the non-high technology/life sciences companies from the SV 150 and created a parallel Bay Area 25 (BA 25) index made up of the 25 largest such companies ranked by revenue. While not presented in this report, Fenwick does collect and analyze the same set of data for the BA 25, which can be obtained by consulting your Fenwick & West Securities Partner. In addition, companies are not included in the data set (on a subject-by-subject basis) if information is not available because no SEC filing with the relevant data was made (generally as a result of acquisition). In the 2012 proxy season, one such company was not included in the SV 150 data set for all subjects.
volatility in the statistical trends within each of the indices is a reflection of changes in the constituents of the index over time.\textsuperscript{108} Finally, some companies are constituents of both indices.\textsuperscript{109} Those companies are included in the data sets of both groups for purposes of this survey.

\section*{Proxy Season / Proxy Statements}

To be included in the data set for a particular “proxy season,” the definitive proxy statement for a company’s annual meeting generally must have been filed by the company with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the year ended June 30, irrespective of when the annual meeting was actually held.\textsuperscript{110} In some instances, a company may not have consistently filed its annual meeting proxy statement on the same side of the cutoff date each year. In such cases, we have normalized the data by including only one proxy statement per year for a company (and including a proxy statement in a “proxy season” year even though it was filed beyond the normal cutoff).\textsuperscript{111} In some instances, a company may not have filed an annual meeting proxy statement during a year at all (or held any annual meeting).\textsuperscript{112} In such instances, data was gleaned for that company from other SEC filings to the extent available.\textsuperscript{113}

Generally, where a trend graphic identifies a year, it presents information as of the time of the proxy statement (such as the number of directors or whether the company has a woman CEO), in which event the data speaks as to circumstances in effect at the time of the proxy statement (rather than at some particular time during the preceding year or immediately following the annual meeting) and is presented by “proxy season” (as defined for purposes of the survey). Generally, any discussion of the data will be by “proxy season” and will be shown in graphics with a “2013” statistic representing the most recent “proxy season” (and so on for each preceding proxy season shown).

\begin{itemize}
\item[108] Other factors include changes in board membership and turnover in the chief executive officer of constituent companies.
\item[109] For example, for the 2012 proxy season, the following companies were included in each of the S&P 100 and the SV 150 (in order of rank within the SV 150 index): Apple (1), Hewlett-Packard (2), Intel (3), Cisco Systems (4), Google (5), Oracle (6) and Gilead Sciences (10).
\item[110] I.e., the proxy statements included in the 2012 proxy season survey were generally filed with the SEC from July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012.
\item[111] E.g., several companies generally filed proxy statements in June each year, but in a particular year filed in July (or later). The data for such a proxy statement was “moved” into the data set for the “proxy season” year before the cutoff.
\item[112] This can occur for a variety of reasons, including among others instances where: (a) a company could fail to timely file its periodic reports due to a pending or potential accounting restatement (such as during the so-called “stock option backdating scandals” that afflicted several Silicon Valley companies), or (b) a company was acquired or had agreed to be acquired (and determined to defer an annual meeting during the pendency of the acquisition).
\item[113] Generally Forms 10-K or S-4 and Schedules 14D-9 or TO as well as proxy statements for mergers (Schedules 14A) when the company is in the process of being acquired. These sources generally provide only a subset of the data available in an annual meeting proxy statement (Schedule 14A). Sometimes these filings were made beyond the standard cutoff for the relevant proxy season for purposes of the survey, but were nonetheless included in the survey data set for that proxy season if they generally presented data for the period that would have been covered by the proxy statement for that company if it had been filed.
\end{itemize}
Methodology (continued)

Nominating and Governance Committees / Other Standing Committees

Generally, the companies surveyed have a unified committee with responsibility for both nominating and governance functions. However, a small number of companies have separate committees for nominating functions and for governance functions.\(^{114}\) For statistical purposes, where separate committees existed, the data for the nominating committee was included (and data for the governance committee ignored) for the information presented in this report. Such separate governance committees were also ignored for purposes of the statistics for “Other Standing Committees” included in this report. Similarly, an exceedingly small number of companies have had a committee that combined the nominating function with the function of one of the other primary committees in a single committee.\(^{115}\) In such rare instances, the data for that committee was included in the data set for each of the primary committees it comprised.\(^{116}\) In addition, some companies have not formed a nominating committee,\(^{117}\) and instead nomination decisions are made by the independent directors as a group.\(^{118}\) In such instances, our statistics have treated that group as the nominating committee. Further, with respect to the statistics regarding “Other Standing Committees” included in this report, we have disregarded “Stock Option,” “Equity Incentive” and other committees whose sole (or almost exclusive) function is to approve grants to non-executive employees and consultants of the company.\(^{119}\)

Executive Officers (and NEOs)

SEC regulations define the term “executive officer” as a company’s “president, any vice president of the [company] in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, administration or finance), any other officer who performs a policy making function, or any other person who performs similar policy making functions for the [company].”\(^{120}\) A company’s determination of executive officers under this definition is an inherently factual one, with the focus less on a person’s title and more on their actual duties or substantive role within the company. The SEC Staff will not provide advice or concurrence regarding a determination. So companies, with the advice of their counsel, must apply the facts, judicial decisions and

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114 While always rare, it has become increasingly less common over time.
115 Such as a unified “Compensation and Corporate Governance Committee” that the proxy statement described as having nominating functions.
116 E.g., data for a unified “Compensation and Corporate Governance Committee” that the proxy statement described as having nominating functions was included in the data for the Compensation Committee and the Nominating Committee with respect to that company.
117 This was considerably more common, particularly in the SV 150, prior to the wave of governance reforms in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
118 In some instances, particularly before the wave of governance reforms in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the nominating decisions were made by the board as a whole.
119 These “committees” generally consist of the CEO as the sole member or are made up of members of the company’s management team operating with delegated authority in order to relieve the board of the burden of routine grants of stock-based compensation. Consequently, they are not really indicative of general board operations.
120 See Rule 3b-7 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. The rule goes on to provide that “[e]xecutive officers of subsidiaries [of a company] may be deemed executive officers of the [parent company] if they perform such policy making functions for the [parent company].”
various statements by the SEC Staff when applying the rule.\footnote{121} We have not tried to second-guess these inherently subjective conclusions, and have simply accepted the executive officer determinations made by companies and/or their boards as reflected in their SEC filings.\footnote{122} It is possible that the number of executive officers is effectively systematically under-reported due to the timing of executive departures.\footnote{123}

In addition to the requirement to identify and provide the limited biographical information regarding their executive officers referenced in “Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team,” companies that are going public are also required to provide similar disclosure regarding employees “such as production managers, sales managers, or research scientists who are not executive officers but who make or are expected to make significant contributions to the business of the [company].”\footnote{124} While not required, some companies continue the practice of listing “key employees” in their periodic public filings.\footnote{125} Where such information is provided, while not included for purposes of the statistical information for “executive officers” and any related analysis, the information regarding “key employees” was used for statistics and the related analysis to the extent it covered particular positions.\footnote{126}

While the definition of “executive officer” has been constant for many years (albeit with the subjective judgments and other factors discussed above), the definition of “named executive officers,” in addition to being more complex, has changed over time (both directly and indirectly in the form of changes to the way total compensation is calculated).\footnote{127} In its current form, the definition includes the company’s principal executive officer (generally CEO), principal financial officer (generally CFO) and three most highly
compensated executive officers other than those specified individuals. However, for many years prior to 2007, the definition did not require the inclusion of the CFO (rather, it required the CEO and the four most highly compensated executive officers other than the CEO). In addition, at that same time, the definition of compensation used to determine the most highly compensated executive officers was changed from simply aggregating the base salary and bonus of an officer to also including the accounting charge recorded with respect to outstanding stock-based compensation for the year for that officer, any non-equity plan compensation and the value of a bucket of “all other compensation.” Further, in early 2009, the definition of total compensation was again revised to require inclusion of the aggregate grant date accounting fair value for stock awards, even if subject to vesting requirements (rather than just the amount recorded as an expense for accounting purposes in the year being reported — which had the effect of taking into account such vesting requirements). We did not attempt to adjust the data in any way for these changes, which to a degree limits comparability across the proxy seasons covered in this report (and leads to some discrepancy within proxy seasons, as the different companies followed different rules depending on timing of proxy filing within the season for those seasons in which a rule transition occurred).

In this survey, we have presented data for a number of specific executive officer positions (CEO, CFO, etc.). In a number of instances across the period of the survey, companies have combined two or more of the executive officer positions. Except where noted, we have counted an executive serving in multiple roles in the data for each of the positions presented separately. The determination of roles is almost always based simply on the titles of the executive officers (and in a few cases, key employees) listed in the

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128 In a small number of cases, the SV 150 has included companies that qualify as “smaller reporting companies” or, recently, as “emerging growth companies” (EGCs were introduced as part of the JOBS Act, effectively beginning with IPOs on or after December 9, 2011), and consequently are only required to include a company’s CEO and two next most highly compensated executive officers (as well as any other person that served as CEO during the fiscal year and up to two additional individuals for whom disclosure would have been provided as one of the most highly compensated officers but for the fact that the individual did not happen to still be serving as an executive officer at the end of the fiscal year). See Regulation S-K, Item 402(m)(2). This may exacerbate the potential skewing of NEO membership discussed in “Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team—‘Named Executive Officers’” and footnotes 69–71.


130 This bucket includes, among other things, any perks (that exceed $10,000 in value), tax “gross-ups” or reimbursements, stock discounts, amounts contributed by the company to defined compensation plans, life insurance premiums paid by the company and dividends on stock awards. See Item 402(c)(2)(ix) of Regulation S-K.

131 See SEC Release No. 33-9089, which reversed the wisdom of SEC Release No. 33-8765 (which had required only inclusion of the “proportionate amount of an award’s total fair value that is recognized in the company’s financial statements for the fiscal year”).

132 The impact of the idiosyncrasies in the rules for determining “most highly compensated” executive officers discussed in “Gender Diversity on the Executive Management Team—‘Named Executive Officers’” and footnote 69, which can cause swings in NEO membership within a company from year to year, even where there has been neither a change in the management team nor a material change in their compensation, could also affect comparability across periods.

133 E.g., “General Counsel and Senior Vice President, Corporate Development.”

134 I.e., for the president/top operations executive and the top marketing executive.

135 E.g., a “General Counsel and Senior Vice President, Corporate Development” has been counted in the numerator (if female) and/or the denominator for statistics related to general counsels and to corporate/business development executives.
Gender Diversity in Silicon Valley
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2013 Proxy Season

Methodology (continued)

applicable SEC filings,136 and a general understanding of the roles such titles encompass. Naturally, there is a degree of judgment involved in these determinations, and views may differ. It is certainly possible that our determinations are at variance from the actual roles performed by particular executive officers.

Gender
In almost all cases, the proxy statement or other SEC filings of a company clearly identify the gender of each of its executive officers and directors.137 In a small number of instances, we resorted to limited supplemental research (apart from reviewing SEC filings) to identify gender.138 This supplemental research generally took the form of researching a relevant individual on freely available public sources.139 We accepted the gender identifications in SEC filings or such supplemental sources at face value.

136 In a very small number of cases, companies have included some description of the roles of executive officers beyond simply stating the titles (e.g., in the brief biography of each executive presented in the filing).
137 I.e., through the use of the prefix “Mr.” or “Ms.” in the individual’s biographical description or elsewhere in the filing(s).
138 Most typically these involved instances in which the prefix “Dr.” was consistently used (and the prefix “Mr.” or “Ms.” was not).
139 I.e., the bio for such individual on the relevant company’s web page or the web pages of other companies for which the individual serves as an executive officer or director, LinkedIn profiles, biographical profiles prepared by reputable online sources, etc.
Additional Resources

In addition to the many resources referenced or cited in the footnotes to this report, which contain a wealth of information and analysis on the subject of gender diversity (as well as other traditional aspects of diversity), the following resources may be helpful to anyone interested in the subject of gender diversity in Silicon Valley (and in the high technology and life science industries):

**Technology Industry**

*Women in IT: The Facts* by the National Center for Women & Information Technology (NCWIT) (September 30, 2009)

*NCWIT Scorecard: A Report on the Status of Women in Information Technology* (December 31, 2010)

“High-skilled immigration debate grows over stark gender imbalance, favoring men for H-1B visas” by Matt O’Brien in the *San Jose Mercury News* (March 19, 2013)

*Senior Technical Women: A Profile of Success* by Caroline Simard and Shannon K. Gilmartin of the Anita Borg Institute for Women and Technology (2010)

*Women Technologists Count: Recommendations and Best Practices to Retain Women in Computing* by the Anita Borg Institute for Women and Technology (September 24, 2013)


**Education**

*Girls in IT: The Facts* by the NCWIT (November 30, 2012)

*Education and Tech Entrepreneurship* by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (May 2008)


*Addressing Core Equity Issues in K–12 Computer Science Education: Identifying Barriers and Sharing Strategies* by the Anita Borg Institute for Women and Technology (2010)


“Women Are Earning Greater Share of STEM Degrees, but Doctorates Remain Gender-Skewed (Women are more likely than men to withdraw from science)” by John Matson in *Scientific American* (April 23, 2013)
Additional Resources (continued)

“Men’s and Women’s Intentions to Persist in Undergraduate Engineering Degree Programs” by James P. Concannon and Lloyd H. Barrow in *Journal of Science Education and Technology* (April 2012)

“Fewer Women Are Choosing College Business Programs” by Erin Zlomek in *Bloomberg BusinessWeek* (March 22, 2013)

*Catalyst Quick Take: Women MBAs* by Catalyst (2012)

**Business schools that feed into Silicon Valley:**

- Stanford University Graduate School of Business: School Profile
- University of California, Berkeley Haas School of Business: Class Profile
- Harvard Business School: Class Profile
- UC Davis Graduate School of Management: Class Profile
  140
- Santa Clara University Leavey School of Business


*Catalyst Quick Take: Women in Law in the U.S.* by Catalyst (2013)

**Law schools that feed into Silicon Valley:**

- Stanford Law School: 2012–2013 Enrollment Profile
- University of California Berkeley School of Law: Profile for Class of 2016
- Harvard Law School: Profile for Class of 2015
- UC Davis School of Law: Student Body Profile
- UC Hastings College of the Law: 2012 Entering Class Profile
- Santa Clara University School of Law: 2012 Class Profile

**Venture Capital and Entrepreneurship**

*Sources of Financing for New Technology Firms: A Comparison by Gender* by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (July 2009)

140  Presents data for full-time MBA program. See also the part-time MBA class profile.
2011 Venture Census by the National Venture Capital Association and Dow Jones VentureSource


“High Performance Entrepreneurs: Women in High Tech” by Cindy Padnos of Illuminate Ventures (February 1, 2010)


“Female Entrepreneurs Hit Glass Ceiling for VC Funding” by Nonny de la Peña in PBS Idealab (March 23, 2011)

The Angel Investor Market in 2012: A Moderating Recovery Continues by the University of New Hampshire Center for Venture Research

“Do Women Take as Many Risks as Men?” by Doug Sundheim in Harvard Business Review’s HBR Blog Network (February 27, 2013)

Service Providers

Catalyst Quick Take: Women in Financial Services by Catalyst (2013)


Catalyst Quick Take: Women in Accounting by Catalyst (2013)

“Research on Women’s Advancement in Accounting” by Louise Single and Elizabeth Dreike Almer in Issues in Accounting Education (2007)

The American Lawyer’s 2013 Diversity Scorecard

“Survey Finds High-Level Women In-House Lawyers Paid Less” by Rebekah Mintzer in Corporate Counsel (September 9, 2013)

But, see also “Are Women Really More Risk-Averse than Men?” a working paper by Julie A. Nelson of Tufts University (September 2012), which reviews “substantial literature in economics and finance has concluded that women are more risk averse than men” and offers a critique of the breadth of the conclusion often drawn from the research, and “Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence” by Catherine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman in the Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Volume 1 (2008), “there is enough counter-evidence to warrant caution” when drawing conclusions from laboratory evidence.

Diversity rankings for law firms are also published by Corporate Counsel, Vault and MultiCultural Law Magazine. See also The NALP Directory of Legal Employers, which allows you to search for demographic data on law firms, including major Silicon Valley firms.

This article in Corporate Counsel, an ALM Media Properties, LLC publication, references the 2013 Law Department Compensation Benchmarking Survey sold by ALM Legal Intelligence, which reported that female GCs make approximately 80% of the total cash compensation of male GCs, with smaller bonuses accounting for a large part of the disparity.
Additional Resources (continued)

*Report of the Seventh Annual NAWL National Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms* by The National Association of Women Lawyers and The NAWL Foundation (October 2012)

**Large Companies**

*2012–2013 UC Davis Study of California Women Business Leaders — A Census of Women Directors and Highest-Paid Executives* by the University of California, Davis Graduate School of Management

*2012 Census of Women Directors and Executive Officers of Massachusetts Public Companies — Unfinished Business* by The Boston Club

*Examining the Cracks in the Ceiling: A Survey of Corporate Diversity Practices of the S&P 100* by Calvert Investments (March 2013)
About the Firm

Fenwick & West provides comprehensive legal services to technology and life science clients of national and international prominence. Fenwick is committed to providing innovative, cost-effective and practical legal services that focus on global technology industries and issues. We have built internationally recognized practices in a wide spectrum of corporate, intellectual property, tax and litigation areas. We have also received praise for our innovative use of technology, our pro bono work and our diversity efforts. We differentiate ourselves by having a deep understanding of our clients’ technologies, industry environments and business needs. For more information, visit www.fenwick.com.

From our founding in 1972, diversity and inclusion have been core components of our culture, and we commit significant resources towards improving our efforts at the firm across all levels.

The firm actively recruits diverse attorneys—race, gender, sexual orientation, physical ability, geographic/cultural background—through numerous channels, including on-campus initiatives and minority bar associations and job fairs. We believe that respect for and acknowledgment of others’ backgrounds fosters cooperation, creativity and mutual understanding and helps us serve our clients better.

Fenwick has implemented a number of diversity and inclusion initiatives, including:

- **Diversity and Inclusion Committee**: To refine existing diversity programs as well as plan and implement innovative new diversity and inclusion initiatives.

- **Women’s Leadership Initiative**: Focused on building the leadership, management and business development skills of our women attorneys.

- **Diversity and Inclusion Leadership Initiative**: Partners commit to fulfilling a variety of diversity-promoting action items throughout the year.

- **Bar Association Activities**: To promote the advancement of diversity and inclusion initiatives in the broader legal community; Fenwick attorneys chair key diversity and inclusion committees.

- **Affinity Groups**: Informal attorney groups centered on common interests and backgrounds to create a more comfortable and inclusive environment.

- **Attorney Recruiting Initiative**: A commitment to maintain strong representation of diverse attorneys in Fenwick’s summer program as well as participation in minority job fairs and interfacing with diverse law student groups.

For the fifth consecutive year, the firm held a top-ten national ranking as one of the most diverse U.S. law firms in *The American Lawyer’s 2013 Diversity Scorecard*. 
About the Authors

David A. Bell’s practice includes advising startup companies, venture capital financings, mergers and acquisitions, initial public offerings and intellectual property licensing, as well as counseling public companies in corporate, securities, governance and compliance matters. He represents a wide range of technology companies, from privately held startups to publicly traded corporations.

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The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of any other partner of Fenwick & West LLP or the firm as a whole, nor do they necessarily represent the views of the firm’s many clients that are mentioned in this report or are constituents of either the SV 150 or the S&P 100 indices.

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